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I. INTRODUCTION

Thirteen-year-old J.W. did not want to leave her great-grandmother's
house to go live with her mother and her mother's boyfriend in their
new apartment.' On her first day living with them, J.W. planned in her
diary how she was going to kill her mother by stabbing her to death.2
Then, she would call her great-grandmother to ask for help and tell her
that her mom had been stabbed.3 Five days later, J.W. carried out the
plans written in her diary. 4 When her mother was leaving for a doctor's
car, stabbing her over two
appointment, J.W. killed her mother in the
5
hundred times with three different knives.
If this incident had occurred two years earlier, the state's attorney
would have had two options for prosecuting J.W.: (1) petition the
juvenile court for a discretionary transfer to try J.W. in adult court, or
(2) require J.W. to remain in juvenile court, which would lose
jurisdiction over J.W. upon her twenty-first birthday. 6 Instead, J.W.
became the first juvenile in Cook County to be tried in an extended
jurisdiction juvenile ("EJJ") prosecution. 7 The distinguishing feature of

an EJJ prosecution is that a juvenile receives both a juvenile sentence
and an adult sentence. 8 The adult sentence is only imposed if the
juvenile violates her juvenile sentence. 9 Otherwise, the adult sentence
is vacated upon successful completion of the juvenile sentence.l° After
1. In re J.W., 804 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (I11.App. Ct. 2004).
2. Id. She wrote:
go and hide in the hall stab her in the back intill [sic] she dies come back in the house
and call grandma. tell her my mom said she was going out to the car to get something
that was like twenty minutes ago. <<I'm going to see where she's ate [sic] because she
asked me to clean my glass mirror off but I don't see the windex leave out Oh ma
ma-ma Dead grandma. Help somebody knock on someones door help my mom's has
got stabed. Oh let me go get my folder out of her trunk>> ....
Id. (<<... >> denotes strike outs).
3. Id.

4. Id. at 1097.
5. Id. at 1097-98. After the first knife became lodged in her mother's abdomen, J.W. went
inside and took a bread knife from the kitchen. Id. She returned for another knife because the
bread knife was too dull to cut well. Id.
6.

DNA Test Set for Girl in Mom's Death, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 2000, at 3 ("Kip Owen, chief

of the delinquency division of the state's attorney's juvenile justice bureau, said his office is still
weighing whether the girl should be charged as an adult."). See infra Section II.C (explaining the
procedure to transfer a juvenile to adult court).
7. Aamer Madhani, Dual Sentence for Girl Who Killed Mom, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2001, at 2
[hereinafter Dual Sentence for Girl]; Aamer Madhani, Girl, 13, Convicted in Mom's Slaying, CHI.

TRIB., June 9, 2001, at 12.
8. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(4) (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
9. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(7) (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
10. Id. See infra Part III for a more detailed explanation of the EJJ statute.
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J.W. was convicted, she received an adult sentence of thirty-five years
in prison and a juvenile sentence of at least five years in a juvenile
detention center.1 1 She began serving her juvenile sentence with the
threat of the adult sentence hanging over her head as an added incentive
to follow the terms of her juvenile sentence. 12 The court will impose
the thirty-five-year sentence only if J.W. violates the juvenile
sentence. 13 If she does not violate the juvenile sentence, J.W. will be
14
released by the time she turns twenty-one years old.
At her sentencing hearing, J.W. promised the judge, "I plan on doing
15
everything in my power to stay out of trouble. I am not a bad person."
However, because the EJJ statute was new, no one knew what J.W. had
to do to stay out of trouble, or what offenses were serious enough to
trigger the adult sentence. 16 Even the prosecutor was "unclear what
kind of offense would be serious enough to invoke her adult murder
17
sentence."
Illinois has joined the growing number of states that use a form of
blended sentencing, called EJJ prosecutions, in which a juvenile
receives both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence. 18 The juvenile
has the opportunity to avoid serving the adult sentence and having a
19
criminal record by successfully completing the juvenile sentence.
However, if the juvenile commits a new offense while serving her
juvenile sentence, the adult sentence will be executed. 20 If the juvenile
violates a condition, other than by committing a new offense (a
"technical violation"), the judge has discretion in deciding whether to
revoke the EJJ designation and execute the adult sentence. 2 1 As J.W.'s
case demonstrates, however, the specific guidelines regarding when to
22
revoke EJJ status and send a juvenile to the adult system are unclear.

11. Dual Sentence for Girl, supra note 7, at 2.
12. Id.
13. Kevin Lynch, Girl's Trial Opens in Killing of Mother. Prosecution Calls 'Attitude' a
Motive, CHI. TRIB., May 31,2001, at 1 [hereinafter Girl's Trial Opens].
14. Id.
15. Dual Sentence, supra note 7, at 2.
16. Id.; Girl's Trial Opens, supra note 13 at 1.
17. Girl's Trial Opens, supra note 13, at 1.
18. See infra Part III.B (discussing the history of the EJJ statute and its provisions).
19. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(7) (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
20. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6) (2006), amended by 2007 I11.Legis. Serv. 95-331
(West).
21. Id.
22. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (stating the procedure was unclear).
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Exposing a minor to the adult system has grave consequences, and
thus it should only be a last resort. 23 This Comment discusses the
current EJJ revocation procedure and suggests an alternative that will
24 Part II
maximize a juvenile's likelihood of successful rehabilitation.
of this Comment traces the history of the juvenile justice system,
focusing on the changing jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the
increasingly punitive approach towards juvenile offenders taken in the
second half of the twentieth century. 25 Part III examines the Illinois
Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998 ("1998 Act") and the new EJJ
statute. 26 First, it discusses the policy shift found in the 1998 Act
towards restorative justice and integrating the needs of the offender, the
victim, and of society.2 7 Next, it examines the mechanics of the EJJ
statute and looks to the legislative history behind EJJ for further
understanding. 2 8 Finally, it discusses two cases that argue that the EJJ
revocation process is unconstitutional because it is impermissibly
vague. 29 Part IV begins by arguing that to protect the public, judges
should work towards keeping as many juveniles out of the adult system
as possible because juveniles in the adult system tend to have higher
recidivism rates than those retained in the juvenile system.3 0 It then
examines problems with the procedure for revoking the EJJ designation
and executing the adult sentence, focusing on claims that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague. 3 1 It concludes by arguing the EJJ statute is
not facially unconstitutional, but may be vulnerable to an as-applied
challenge to a revocation based on a technical violation. 3 2 Nonetheless,
Part IV demonstrates that although the statute is constitutional, a judge's
lack of discretion may sweep some juveniles into the adult system

23. See infra Part IV.A (detailing the harms juveniles face in the adult system).
24. See infra Part V (proposing a procedure that will give the juvenile more than one
opportunity at success in the juvenile system).
25. See infra Part H1(discussing the history behind the current juvenile justice system in
Illinois).
26. See infra Part III (setting out the current state of the law).
27. See infra Part III.A (discussing the 1998 juvenile justice reforms that adopted the
philosophy of balanced and restorative justice).
28. See infra Part IlIl.A, III.B.I (explaining the mechanisms of the EJJ statute and the
legislative history).
29. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the two cases that have challenged the constitutionality
of the statute for being vague).
30. See infra Part IV.A (explaining juvenile development and how it relates to the juvenile

justice system).
31. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing the problems in the revocation process).
32. See infra Part IV.B.2 (describing situations in which a juvenile's EJJ designation might be
revoked for a technical violation, even when the juvenile did not have notice that his conduct was
prohibited).
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prematurely. 33 Part V offers a solution to the uncertainties in the EJJ
revocation process by suggesting a different procedure for a judge to
the
follow in cases of technical violations and by recommending that
34
legislature amend the statute to make all revocations discretionary.
II.BACKGROUND
Juvenile crime is not a new phenomenon. 35 Reports of juveniles on
trial for robbery and murders date back to seventeenth century England,
and such crimes continue today. 36 Even though juvenile crime is not
new, the legal system's approach to juvenile crime has significantly
changed over time. 37 This Part traces the changing response to juvenile
crime in Illinois. 3 8 First, it examines how the early system treated

juvenile offenders in the same manner as adult offenders and presents
various factors contributing to the creation of the juvenile court,
particularly the practice of confining children and adult offenders
together. 39 Next, this Part looks at the initial Juvenile Court Act of
1899 (the "Juvenile Court Act"), which had a singular focus on
rehabilitating the offender, not on punishing him. n0 It discusses the
juvenile court's struggles for legitimacy and its uneasy relationship with
the criminal court. 4 1 It also traces the emergence of a punitive focus in
the juvenile court and the growing societal dissatisfaction with how the

juvenile court treated juvenile offenders, leading to more circumstances
33. See infra Part IV.B. 1 (explaining that a juvenile on probation can commit a new offense,
but still complete probation successfully).
34. See infra Part V (proposing to give the juvenile more than one last chance).
35. See Christian Sullivan, Juvenile Delinquency in the Twenty-First Century: Is Blended
Sentencing the Middle-Road Solution for Violent Kids?, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 485 (2001)

(discussing references to juvenile delinquency found in the Hammurabic Code).
36. Id. at 485-86.
37. See Stacey Sabo, Note, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court

Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2429-36 (1996) (detailing how the juvenile court
evolved from English common law and changed over time).
38. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing how children who knew the
difference between right and wrong were treated as adults); notes 63-72 and accompanying text
(discussing how the 1899 Juvenile Court Act separated children and adults in the court system);
notes 125-136 and accompanying text (discussing the punitive shift in juvenile justice in the
1980s and 1990s).
39. See infra Part II.A (discussing how the legal system did not distinguish between juvenile
and adult offenders once juveniles were shown to be competent, and discussing the desire to
shelter children from adult influence that led to the juvenile court).
40. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused":
The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 646-

49 (2002). See infra Part II.B (detailing the Juvenile Court Act of 1899).
41. See infra notes 92-112 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional challenges to the
Juvenile Court Act and the concurrent jurisdiction between criminal and juvenile courts).
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in which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. 42 This Part concludes by
showing that near the end of the twentieth century, the court mainly
focused on the offense committed, not on the individual who committed
it-a complete reversal from the original intent of the Juvenile Court
Act.

43

A. Children in the Criminal System Before the Juvenile Court Act
The status of children in the eyes of the law has changed remarkably
over the past two centuries. 44 At common law, most children accused
of breaking the law were treated in the same manner as adults, with a
few exceptions. 45 Young children, for instance, had the benefit of the
infancy defense, which provided children under the age of seven with
immunity from prosecution because the law presumed they were
incapable of forming criminal intent. 46 Children between the ages of
seven and fourteen were also presumed to lack criminal capacity, but
the prosecution could rebut this by showing that the children knew the
difference between right and wrong. 4 7 Finally, the law considered
children over the age of fourteen fully responsible for their actions and
48
punished them as adults.

42. See infra notes 125-136 and accompanying text (discussing how people thought the
juvenile court was too soft on offenders and could not adequately punish juvenile offenders).
43. See infra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (describing how the main focus shifted
from the individual who committed the offense to the offense committed).
44. See Mark. R. Fondacaro, Christopher Slobogin, & Tricia Cross, Reconceptualizing Due
Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributionsfrom Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955,
958-61 (2006) (describing the history of juvenile law).
45. Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to CriminalCourt in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 375 (1998).
46. Id.
47. Id.
Relevant factors [in rebutting the presumption of incapacity] included evidence of the
youth's plan and method of execution, as well as prior similar conduct. The fact that
the youth tried to hide the crime, either physically or by lying, was also pertinent to the
question of legal responsibility. The inquiry might also extend into the child's
environment, intelligence, education, and moral underpinnings.
James Herbie DiFonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REV. 1, 28-29
(2001) (citations omitted).
48. Klein, supra note 45, at 375. Illinois adopted the common law approach when it became a
state in 1818. FRED GROSS, DETENTION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILDREN 12 (Central Howard
Association 1946). It subsequently modified the infancy defense in 1827 by raising the age of
criminal responsibility to ten. Id; see ILL. REV. STAT. CH. XXX DIV. I SEC. 4 (1845) ("An infant
under the age of ten years, shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor."). At that
point, children under ten were immune from prosecution, and children between the ages of ten
and fourteen could only be tried for a crime if the prosecution showed the child knew the
difference between good and evil. ILL. REV. STAT. CH. XXX DIV. I SEC. 3 (1845) ("A person
shall be considered of sound mind.., who hath arrived at the age of fourteen years, or before that
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In Illinois, prior to the enactment of the Juvenile Court Act, children
ages ten and older were subject to the same procedure as adults with
regard to arrest, detention, and trial. 4 9 However, sentencing was
slightly different for the two populations. 50 Children under the age of
eighteen could only be sent to the penitentiary if convicted of robbery,
burglary, arson, murder, or manslaughter. 5 1 For any other crime that
carried a punishment of imprisonment, children between the ages of
sixteen and eighteen were sent to the county jail, rather than the
penitentiary. 52 Offenders under the age of sixteen were supposed to be
sent to reform schools. 53 Despite these guidelines in the criminal code,
in practice, many children under the age of sixteen were jailed with
adults.

54

age, if such person know the distinction between good and evil."). Children over the age of
fourteen were still fully responsible for their acts. Id.
49. GROSS, supra note 48, at 12.
The common criminal law did not differentiate between the adult and the minor who
had reached the age of criminal responsibility . . . . The fundamental thought in
criminal jurisprudence was not, and in most jurisdictions is not, reformation of the
criminal, but punishment; punishment as expiation for the wrong; punishment as a
warning to other possible wrong-doers. The child was arrested, put into prison,
indicted by the grand jury, tried by a petit jury, under all the forms and technicalities of
our criminal law, with the aim of ascertaining whether it had done the specific actnothing else-and if it had, then of visiting the punishment of the state upon it.
Julian W. Mack, Appendix I to SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE & EDITH ABBOTT, THE
DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE HOME 185-86 (1912), availableat http://www.brocku.ca/
MeadProject/Abbott/BreckinridgeAbbott_1912/BreckinridgeAbbott 1912_toc.html.
50. ILL. REV. STAT. CH. XXX Div. XV SEC. 168 (1845).
51. Id.; ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 38 SEC. 449 (1898).
52. ILL. REV. STAT. CH. XXX Div. XV SEC. 168 (1845).
53. GROSS, supra note 48, at 12-13. The alternatives to prison were reformatories, industrial
schools (for girls), and training schools (for boys). Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread:
Diversion in the Jurisprudenceof Juvenile Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 142, 147
(Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). There was the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac
for boys and a Reformatory at Geneva for girls. In addition, Industrial and Manual Training
School laws, passed in 1879 and 1883, provided another option. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 102-07, 110-14 (2d ed. 1977).
54. In 1898, 575 children were confined in the county jail of Cook County (Chicago), Illinois.
TIMOTHY D. HURLEY, ORIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW 11-12 (AMS Press 1977).
There were 1983 boys committed to the House of Correction (City Prison) of the City of Chicago,
Illinois, for the twenty months ending November 1, 1898. Id. at 12. The boys' offenses included:
petty thefts, disorderly conduct, killing birds, fighting, truancy, stealing rides on the railroad, and
flipping street cars. Id. Twenty-five percent of the boys were charged with truancy. Id. Many of
the boys violated a city ordinance and were fined anywhere between one and one hundred dollars.
Id. When they did not pay the fine, they were sent to the City Prison to work off the fine at the
rate of fifty cents a day. Id. "In Chicago, 332 boys from nine to sixteen years of age were sent to
the city jail between January 1, 1899, and July 1, 1899, when the juvenile court law went into
effect; all but three of these were committed to the jail because of inability to pay fines assessed
against them." GROSS, supra note 48 at 13. John L. Whitman, the Cook County jailor in 1901,
submitted statistics to the Juvenile Record, a publication devoted to juvenile court news.
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The conditions children faced in jails led activist groups to try to
change how the justice system treated children. 5 5 The most influential
was the Chicago Women's Club, a group of high-society women that

worked for better treatment of children. 56 The organization strove for
years to segregate children from adults in penal facilities and to provide
education for the incarcerated children. 57 The women believed that
mixing children and adults in prison exposed malleable children to
criminal influence. 5 8 Rather than reforming children into law-abiding
citizens, this exposure taught them the ways of criminal life. 59 In 1895,
the Chicago Women's Club convinced the Board of Education to
establish the John Worthy School in the House of Correction ("City
Prison") of Chicago. 60 The boys incarcerated in City Prison went to
school during the day, but were then locked in their cells with the adults
for the remainder of the time. 6 1 Not satisfied with this victory, the
Chicago Women's Club continued working towards the complete
62
separation of children and adults in the legal system.

JUVENILE RECORD, 1901, Vol. II No. 8 at 1, reprintedin JUVENILE RECORD: NOVEMBER 1900DECEMBER 1901 (David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman eds., 1987). There were 1130 boys in
Cook County jail in Illinois for the years 1897 and 1898. Id. The number of boys in Cook
County jail for the year ending July 1, 1899, was 575. Id. Two years after the juvenile law was
enacted there were twenty-four boys in the jail. Id.
55. Paul Gerard Anderson, Introduction to ORIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW,
supra note 54, at Introduction Pt. IV; see HURLEY, supra note 54 at 17-18 ("Miss Lathrop
determined to visit and see for herself [the conditions of the state and county institutions] and in
the course of the work she went to every jail and poor house in the State, even in the most out-ofthe-way localities. She was shocked at the conditions she found, young children shut up with the
most depraved adults and being trained in crime instead of being kept away from it. She
determined not to rest until some remedy for these conditions was found." (quoting a letter from
Mrs. Lucy L. Flower)).
56. ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS AND THE RISE
OF JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA AMERICA 19-21, 166 (1998).
57. Anderson, supra note 55, at Introduction Pt. IV.
58. CLAPP, supra note 56, at 28.
59. Id; see also Home for Tramps, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 3, 1893, at 25 ("Boys whose sole
offense is perhaps mischief or some petty theft are committed to the bridewell, where they are
subjected to the evil influences of men hardened in vice and skilled in crime. The result is that
they come out ten times more demoralized in character than when they entered the prison.").
60. HURLEY, supra note 54, at 12; CLAPP, supra note 56, at 40; see also School is an
Elephant, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 30, 1895, at 9 ("People were made to feel [a school] was such
a crying need at the bridewell it was a reproach to the community it had not been built ....
[A]t
last, in a furor of humanitarian enthusiasm, the city erected the building and turned it over to the
Board of Education with a handsome endowment.").
61. HURLEY, supra note 54, at 12.
62. CLAPP, supra note 56, at 41-43.
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B. The Juvenile Court Act of 1899
In 1898, the Chicago Women's Club enlisted the Chicago Bar
Association to assist in drafting legislation to establish a separate court
for juveniles. 6 3 The two organizations sought to extend the concept of
parens patriae, which traditionally gave the State power over orphans
and incompetents, in order to encompass all neglected and delinquent
children. 64 In 1899, the Illinois legislature enacted the Juvenile Court
Act, titled "An Act to regulate the treatment and control of dependent,
neglected and delinquent children." 65 The Juvenile Court Act defined a
delinquent child as any child under the age of sixteen years who
violated a state, city, or village law. 66 The Juvenile Court Act focused

primarily

on

decriminalizing juvenile

offenses

and

mandated

individualized sentences designed to rehabilitate a child, not to punish
him.67 The bill's proponents believed punishment was inappropriate
because children did not choose to become criminals of their own free
will.6 8 They believed that the primary cause of juvenile crime was an

63. See HURLEY, supra note 54, at 18 ("This is a legal matter. It must not go to the
Legislature as a woman's measure; we must get the Bar Association to handle it." (quoting a
letter from Mrs. Lucy L. Flower)).
64. See Douglas E.Abrams, A Very Special Place in Life: The History of Juvenile Justice in
Missouri, in CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 1050 (Douglas E.
Abrams & Sarah H. Ramsey eds., 2d ed. 2003) (describing the orphan trains sending orphan and
abandoned children from eastern cities to new homes, mostly on midwestern farms). See
generally Marvin Ventrell, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 75 (2006) (explaining the historical
development of parens patriae and how states have broadened the initial application from
orphaned children to all children).
65. 1899111. Laws 131.
66. Id. at 132 ("The words delinquent child shall include any child under the age of sixteen
years who violates any law of this State or any city or village ordinance.").
67. HURLEY, supra note 54, at 23-24; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring, Editors'
Introductionto THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 4 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000) ("[C]hildren who had not violated any laws could be found delinquent and
treated in the same manner as children who had violated laws. Blameworthy conduct was
unnecessary because punishment wasn't a part of the court's response to delinquents.");
Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 40, at 646 ("[T]he basic principle of the [juvenile court] law is
this: That no child under sixteen years of age shall be considered or be treated as a criminal; that a
child under that age shall not be arrested, indicted, convicted, imprisoned, or punished as a
criminal. . . . [I]t provides that a child under the age mentioned shall not be branded in the
opening years of its life with an indelible stain of criminality, or be brought, even temporarily,
into the companionship of men and women whose lives are low, vicious, and criminal." (quoting
Richard S. Tuthill, History of the Children's Court in Chicago, in CHILDREN'S COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS

1,1 (Samuel J. Barrows ed.,

1904)).
68. See Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Note, Sentence Blending and the Promise of Rehabilitation:
Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259, 264 (1999)
(discussing how factors such as poor living environment and lack of moral and educational
structure were believed to cause juvenile delinquency rather than willful behavior).
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unsuitable living environment; thus, changing a child's environment
would prevent crime. 69 The bill's proponents sought to remove all
traces of the criminal system from the new juvenile court; to that end,

the juvenile court used chancery procedures instead of criminal
procedures and changed the terminology to eliminate all connection to
criminal law. 70 Most significantly, if the court determined that a child
committed the offense, the child was not convicted, but rather was
found delinquent. 7 1 Thus, according
to the Juvenile Court Act, no child
72
could be convicted of a crime.
In addition to the change in terminology, the Juvenile Court Act
excluded lawyers from the proceedings. 7 3 The drafters excluded
lawyers to avoid an adversarial process that would impede the goal of
helping the child.7 4 Furthermore, the drafters believed that lawyers

69.

Women in a Novel Role, CHI. DAILY, Jul. 23, 1899, at 14 ("Sociologists have been trying

to prove for a long time that crime is the result of environment. This sentiment has finally...
found expression in the juvenile court law.").
70. HURLEY, supra note 54, at 23-24. Chancery Courts were characterized by flexibility,
guardianship, and protection, focusing more on fairness than the rigid confines of the law. Albert
R. Roberts, The Emergence of the Juvenile Court and ProbationServices, in THE JUVENILE

JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK 164, 164 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2004). The new juvenile court set forth
the charges on a petition, not in a complaint or indictment. HURLEY, supra note 54, at 23.
Furthermore, juvenile judges issued summons for children, not warrants. Id. The difference
between juvenile court proceedings and other legal proceedings was first made explicit in the
statute in 1905:
A disposition of any child under this act or any evidence given in such cause, shall not
in any civil, criminal or other cause or proceeding whatever in any court be lawful or
proper evidence against such child for any purpose whatever, except in subsequent
cases against the same child under this act.
1905 I11.Laws 153. The complete severance from criminal law was made explicit in 1953.
[N]o adjudication under the provisions of this Act shall operate as a disqualification of
any child subsequently to hold public office or as a forfeiture of any right or privilege
or to receive any license granted by public authority; and no child shall be denominated
a criminal by reason of such adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be denominated a
conviction. Neither the fact that a child has been before the children's court for
hearing, nor any confession, admission or statement made by him to the court or to any
officer thereof ... shall ever be admissible as evidence against him or his interests in
any other court or proceedings.
1953 III. Laws 1089.
71.
72.
73.

HURLEY, supra note 54, at 24.
CLAPP, supra note 56, at 180.
Id; see also Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction: The Best of Both

Worlds?, 54 ARK. L. REV. 777, 784-85 (2002) (listing the different terminology used in juvenile
court).
74.

CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 30 (1998).

But see Anderson, supra note 55, at Introduction Pt. VI ("Before retiring to private practice,
Hurley advocated the attendance of lawyers at Juvenile Court hearings in an adversary role.").
The probation officer assumed the lawyer's duties and was the central feature of the Juvenile
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were unnecessary because the central focus of the proceeding was not

on whether the child committed the act, but
rather on determining what
75

services the child needed for reformation.
Instead of lawyers, probation officers played a large role in the
proceedings, which shifted the focus from the actual guilt or innocence
76
of the child to the home life and general behavior of each child.
Based on all the information available, the judge determined what was
best for the child 7 7 and a probation officer supervised the child's
rehabilitation. 7 8 If a child was not committed to an institution, he was
allowed to stay at home or was sent to a foster home, all under the care
and guardianship of a probation officer. 7 9 The probation officer made
"friendly visits" to supervise the child's progress and reported back to
the court. 80 In time, the new juvenile court became a convenient tool

Court Act. HURLEY, supra note 54, at 62. The probation officer was involved at all points of the
procedure, both inside and outside of the courtroom, both before and after the hearing. Id.
[It shall be the duty of the said probation officer to make such investigation as may be
required by the court; to be present in court in order to represent the interests of the
child when the case is heard; to furnish to the court such information and assistance as
the judge may require; and to take such charge of any child before and after trial as
may be directed by the court.
1899 Ill. Laws 133; see also Women in a Novel Role, CHI. DAILY, Jul. 23, 1899 ("[The probation
officers'] duties include the work of policemen, detective, guardian, and teacher. The child,
though guilty, may, if the offense is but slight, be given another chance. Here the probation
officer steps in and 'stands good' for the behavior of the child. When he offends again, the
probation officer brings him to court."). Probation first started in Boston, Massachusetts, as early
as 1841 when John Augustus began assisting offenders whose sentences were suspended with
finding jobs, housing, and dealing with family problems. Marcus Purkiss et al., ProbationOfficer
Functions-A Statutory Analysis, 67 FED. PROBATION 12, 12 (2003). In 1891, Massachusetts
passed an act establishing probation officers throughout the state, under direction of the court.
HURLEY, supra note 54, at 15. Massachusetts' probation system influenced the founders of the
Illinois Juvenile Court. See id. at 13-16 (discussing early efforts around the country to aid
juveniles in court).
75. PETER S. PREsco'Ir, THE CHILD SAVERS 57 (1981); see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967)
("[The reformers] believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty'
or 'innocent,' but 'What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career."').
76. Deborah L. Mills, United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court
System from Rehabilitationto Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 909 (1996).
77. HURLEY, supra note 54, at 24.
78. Id. at 62 (discussing the importance of the probation system to the newly-created juvenile
court).
79. 1899 I11.Laws 134.
80. Id. ("[T]he court may commit the child to the care and guardianship of the probation
officer, to be placed in a suitable family home, subject to the friendly supervision of such
probation officer ... ").
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for exerting jurisdiction over problem children, yet was
considered
81

insufficient by many to deal with serious juvenile offenses.
C. Jurisdictionof the Juvenile Court

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the juvenile court sought to
exert more control over juvenile behavior. 8 2 In 1901, the Illinois
legislature expanded the definition of delinquent, giving the juvenile
court jurisdiction over not only children who committed a crime but
also over those who engaged in undesirable acts that might lead to
criminal behavior. 8 3 In addition to being found guilty of violating a
state, city, or village law, a child could be found delinquent for being
"incorrigible," associating with the wrong people, or being in the wrong
places. 84 The 1905 amendments further expanded the definition of a
delinquent child to include those children who left home without
permission, frequented the wrong places, habitually wandered around
railroad yards or tracks, or used vulgar language. 85 Although such laws
would be impermissible if applied to adults, the civil, as opposed to
criminal, nature of the juvenile court allowed it to exert authority over
86
children that the criminal courts could not exercise over adults.
81. Daniel E. Traver, Note, The Wrong Answer to a Serious Problem: A Story of School
Shootings, Politicsand Automatic Transfer, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 281, 286-88 (2000).
82. See generally PLATT, supra note 53 (painting the reformers as elitists who use the juvenile
court to exert social control over the lower classes).
83. See Klein, supra note 45, at 376-77 ("[The Court] gained jurisdiction over behaviors that
were not crimes if committed by an adult ... truancy, vagrancy, immorality ....");see also
Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the
Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1473-74 (2004) (discussing the idea that
the juvenile court began as a method of social control).
84. 1901 I1. Laws 142. The definition included a child "who is incorrigible; or who
knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons; or who is growing up in idleness
or crime; or who knowingly frequents a house of ill fame; or who knowingly patronizes any
policy shop or place where any gaming device is or shall be operated." Id.
85. 1905 Ill. Laws 153. The definition included any child:
who, without just cause and without the consent of its parents or custodian, absents
itself from its home or place of abode ... or who knowingly frequents a house of illrepute ... or who frequents any saloon or dram shor where intoxicating liquors are
sold; or who patronizes or visits any public pool room or bucket shop; or who wanders
about the streets in the night time without being on any lawful business or occupation;
or who habitually wanders about any railroad yards or tracks or jumps or attempts to
jump onto any moving train; or enters any car or engine without lawful authority; or
who habitually uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language; or who is
guilty of immoral conduct in any public place or about any school house.
Id.
86. See Tracey J. Simmons, Mandatory Mediation: A Better Way to Address Status Offenses,
21 OHIO ST.J.ON Disp. RESOL. 1043, 1046-47 (2006) ("Children classified as 'status offenders'
fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts because they have committed a non-criminal act
that is considered unacceptable solely because of their age.... Every state maintains some form
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By 1905, the juvenile court had original and exclusive jurisdiction
over boys under seventeen and girls under eighteen, but it did not
exercise that jurisdiction in all cases. 8 7 The juvenile court and the

state's attorney practiced a system of concurrent jurisdiction in which
the state's attorney prosecuted the children who committed serious
crimes while on probation and/or who were first-time, violent
offenders. 88
The 1905 amendments to the Juvenile Court Act
formalized the practice by including the first discretionary transfer
provision, which allowed judges to transfer a child from juvenile to
criminal court. 8 9 The juvenile court actively transferred a small number
of cases to criminal court when the judge felt the offender was not
suitable for the juvenile court, usually to prevent those offenders from
corrupting the younger children in the court. 90 Thus, even in its early
years, the juvenile court transferred children whom the court deemed
91
unsuitable for the juvenile system.
The people involved with the juvenile court permitted concurrent
jurisdiction, in part, to avoid any challenges to the constitutionality of
the Juvenile Court Act. 9 2 However, some families resented the juvenile
court for interfering in their lives. 93 In contrast, others believed that the
juvenile court allowed juvenile offenders to escape punishment for their
acts. 94 Therefore, those involved in the juvenile court avoided
cases
95
that would likely allow a challenge to the court's legitimacy.
of status offense jurisdiction based on the notion that the state has a legitimate interest in
protecting the welfare of children.") (citations omitted).
87. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 40, at 646-47.
88. Id. at 647.
89. 1905 Ill.
Laws 156 ("The court may, however, in its discretion cause such child to be
proceeded against in accordance with the laws that may be in force governing the commission of
crime.").
90. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 40, at 647-48 ("Between the years 1915 to 1919, for
example, the court only transferred seventy out of 11,799 cases, or 0.6%. As Judge Merritt
Pinckney explained, '[A] child, a boy especially sometimes becomes so thoroughly vicious and is
so repeatedly an offender that it would not be fair to the other children in a delinquent institution
who have not arrived at his age of depravity and delinquency to have to associate with him. On
very rare and special occasions, therefore, children are held over on a mittimus to the criminal
court.' Almost all of these cases involved boys who were recidivists and at least sixteen years of
age, and the few cases of first offenders were those of boys close to seventeen years of age,
whose crimes 'included daring holdups, carrying guns, thefts of considerable amounts and
rape."') (citations omitted).
91. GROSS, supra note 48, at 17.
92. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (explaining concurrent jurisdiction).
93. E.g., the Lindsay family that challenged the juvenile court's authority and won, infra notes
97-1023 and accompanying text.
94. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 40, at 647 (explaining the worries the juvenile court
personnel had about possible constitutional challenges).
95. Id.
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Such a suit could not be permanently avoided, however, and in 1913
the Illinois Supreme Court heard the first case challenging the
constitutionality of the Juvenile Court Act. 96 In Lindsay v. Lindsay, the
juvenile court declared William Lindsay a dependant child for lack of
97
proper parental care and removed him from his mother's custody.
William's mother appealed the decision. 98 She argued that the Juvenile
Court Act violated the United States Constitution and the Illinois
Constitution because it created a new court that was not authorized by
the United States Constitution.9 9 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
that contention. l0 0 It held that the statute did not create a new court, but
instead gave circuit and county courts concurrent jurisdiction over
certain cases.10 1 The juvenile court was not a separate court; instead, it
exercised the power delegated to it by the courts provided for in the
United States Constitution. 10 2 Thus, Lindsay established that the
juvenile court did not have jurisdiction outside the power granted to it
by the existing courts because no constitutional authority supported
10 3
it.
The Illinois Supreme Court further emphasized the juvenile court's
lack of independent jurisdiction in 1935.104 In People v. Lattimore,
fifteen-year-old Susie Lattimore, who had previously been declared
delinquent, was found guilty of murder in the criminal courts. 10 5 On
appeal, Susie argued that the criminal court was without jurisdiction to
hear her case. 10 6 She argued that because she was fifteen, the case
should have been heard in the juvenile court, and the juvenile court had
not given consent for the criminal court to hear her case.10 7 The Illinois
96. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (discussing the Lindsay case).
97. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 100 N.E. 892, 893 (I11. 1913). A dependant child included a child
who was destitute, homeless, or abandoned, or did not have proper parental care. 1907 III. Laws
71.
98. Lindsay, 100 N.E. at 894.
99. Id.
100. Id. ("Our statute does not, as contended, create a new court unauthorized by the
Constitution.").
101. Id. (discussing the concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit and county courts).
102. Id. ("[The statute] does not create a new court, but delegates powers to constitutional
courts already existing.").
103. GROSS, supra note 48, at 21.
104. People v. Lattimore, 199 N.E. 275 (I11.1935); People ex rel. Malec v. Lewis, 199 N.E.
276 (II. 1935).
105. Lattimore, 199 N.E. at 275.
106. Id.
107. Id. She based her argument on Chapter 23, Section 9a of the Illinois Revised Statutes,
which provides, "The [juvenile] court may in its discretion in any case of a delinquent child
permit such child to be proceeded against in accordance with the laws that may be in force in this
State governing the commission of crimes ..... Id.
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Supreme Court rejected her argument because the Illinois Constitution

granted jurisdiction over criminal cases to the criminal court, not to the
juvenile court. 10 8 This constitutional grant of jurisdiction could not be
10 9
altered by the ordinary legislation found in the Juvenile Court Act.
Thus, while a criminal court could take jurisdiction over a juvenile
without permission from the juvenile court, the juvenile court had no
authority to interfere with a criminal proceeding merely because a
juvenile was involved.1 10 The juvenile court only had the power to
refuse jurisdiction over a pending delinquency case and to transfer it to
adult criminal court. I l l Thus, the juvenile court could not interfere with

a case once it had begun in criminal court, and112a juvenile had no
constitutional right to be tried in the juvenile court.
Consequently, the juvenile court and the criminal court shared

jurisdiction over children who could be prosecuted in the criminal
courts. 113 At the judge's discretion, the juvenile court could transfer a
child to criminal court with no formal hearing. 114 This was the practice
in Illinois and other states until 1966, when the United States Supreme
Court decided Kent v. United States.1 15 In Kent, the D.C. Juvenile
Court waived jurisdiction and transferred sixteen-year-old Kent to
criminal court without holding a hearing, conferring with Kent's parents
or counsel, making findings, or reciting a reason for the waiver.1 1 6 The
United States Supreme Court held that the waiver was invalid and that

108. Id. at 276 ("The Legislature is without authority to confer upon an inferior court the
power to stay a court created by the Constitution from proceeding with the trial of a cause
jurisdiction of which is expressly granted to it by the Constitution.").
109. ld; see Benedict S. Alper, Forty Years of the Juvenile Court, 6 AM. SOC. REv. 230
(1941) (reacting to the Lattimore case and its assault on the juvenile court's existence, calling for
the juvenile court's supporters to continue working on its behalf).
110. Lattimore, 199N.E. at276.
111. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court did not believe the legislature intended that children who
were capable of forming criminal intent could use the juvenile court to escape punishment. Id.
("It was not intended by the Legislature that the juvenile court should be made a haven of refuge
where a delinquent child of the age recognized by law as capable of committing a crime should be
immune from punishment for violation of the criminal laws of the state, committed by such child
subsequent to his or her being declared a delinquent child."); see also People ex rel. Malec, 199
N.E. 276, 277 (Ill. 1935) ("[C]onsent of the juvenile court was not required [for the criminal
court's jurisdiction over a minor previously declared delinquent], and [] the Legislature is without
authority to abridge the jurisdiction of the criminal court of Cook county, which was created by..
[the Illinois] Constitution.").
112. GROSS, supra note 48, at 19-21.
113. See supra note 109-12 and accompanying text (establishing concurrent jurisdiction).
114. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (establishing judicial waiver).
115. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
116. Id. at 543-46.
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Kent was entitled to a transfer hearing."17 Due process demanded a
hearing because transfer could lead to criminal sanctions, which were
1 18
more serious than juvenile sanctions.
Although a judge still made the decision regarding transfer, he was
first required to conduct a hearing and follow certain procedures." l9 In
an appendix, the Court set forth certain criteria for a judge to consider in
determining whether to transfer a juvenile to criminal court. 120 A
waiver was appropriate when a juvenile committed a serious offense, or
when the offense was one in a pattern of repeated offenses. 12 1 The
underlying consideration was whether the juvenile was beyond
rehabilitation or whether transfer was necessary for the protection of the
public.

122

Thus, decades after the Illinois Supreme Court denied juveniles in
Illinois a constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court, the United
States Supreme Court established a statutory right, which granted

minors certain protections that a court must provide before taking away

117. Id.at 557.
118. Id. (pointing out the difference in sentences between the juvenile and criminal courts).
119. Id. at 561 ("Correspondingly, we conclude that an opportunity for a hearing which may
be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver order.").
120. Id. at 566-67. The Court set forth eight factors:
(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection
of the community requires waiver.
(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated
or willful manner.
(3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
(4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a
Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined by consultation
with the United States Attorney).
(5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
(6) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of
his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
(7) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with
the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other
jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions.
(8) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by
the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Id.
121. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67.
122. Id. at 566. See Klein, supra note 45, at 387 (dividing the Kent factors into "two broad
categories: danger to the public and amenability to treatment").

232
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that right. 123 However, because it was only a statutory right, the
legislature, not the United States Constitution, defined the boundaries of
24
that right. 1
D. The Shift Towards a Punitive System
Kent began the juvenile court's transformation towards an adversarial
system, advanced by other United States Supreme Court decisions that
granted juvenile offenders many, but not all, of the due process rights
that adults possess. 12 5 Adding to the converging processes of the
juvenile and adult courts, an influential study came out in the 1970s,
which claimed that rehabilitation programs for criminals were not
effective. 126 Thus came the phrase "nothing works," which undermined
the rehabilitative foundation of the juvenile court.1 27 The public grew
increasingly dissatisfied with what it saw as a broken juvenile justice
12 8
system that was too soft on juvenile offenders, and demanded action.
In response to public demand to get tougher on juvenile crime, the
Illinois legislature changed the contours of the juvenile court's
123. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-57 ("The Juvenile Court is vested with 'original and exclusive
jurisdiction' of the child. This jurisdiction confers special rights and immunities ....
[Kent]then a boy of sixteen-was by statute entitled to certain procedures and benefits as a consequence
of his statutory right to the 'exclusive' jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.").
124. See Sabo, supra note 37, at 2427-28 ("Legislative waiver statutorily excludes a juvenile
from juvenile court jurisdiction by virtue of her offense or by a combination of her age and
offense."). The main difference between statutory and constitutional rights is that statutory rights
can be changed by ordinary legislation, instead of the complicated process in place to amend the
constitution.
125. See Mills, supra note 76, at 913-22 (discussing the Supreme Court cases regarding
juvenile justice); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (granting a juvenile the right to know the
charges against him, the right to counsel, the fight to confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, and the right to remain silent); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (applying the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the State in juvenile cases). But see McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (denying juveniles under juvenile jurisdiction the right to a
jury trial, thereby preserving some distinction between the juvenile and adult system).
126. KATHLEEN M. HEIDE, YOUNG KILLERS: THE CHALLENGE OF JUVENILE HOMICIDE 224
(1999); see Michael Welch, Rehabilitation: Holding Its Ground in Corrections, 59 FED.
PROBATION 3, 4 (1995) ("In a widely cited ... article, [Robert] Martinson concluded: 'With few
and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no
appreciable effect on rehabilitation.' Martinson entitled his article 'What Works?: Questions and
Answers About Prison Reform,' but it quickly became known as the 'nothing works' report.
Contrary to popular opinion [the rehabilitation study] did not make the sweeping claim that
'nothing works.' In fact, they cited positive outcomes in 48 percent of the programs evaluated.").
Subsequent studies contradicted the idea that "nothing works." DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING
VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENILE COURT: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 197
(2001). Effective programs include early and intermediate intervention, individualized treatment,
and dispositional alternatives. Id.
127. MYERS, supra note 126, at 17-18.
128. Id.
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jurisdiction and adopted the state's first automatic transfer law in
1982.129 This legislation was a shift from looking at the individual
circumstances of each juvenile defendant to a blanket exclusion of an
entire group of juveniles from the juvenile court's jurisdiction,
130
regardless of their personal circumstances or any mitigating factors.
Any juvenile fifteen years or older charged with murder, rape, deviant
sexual assault, or armed robbery with a firearm automatically fell under
criminal jurisdiction. 13 1 In the 1980s and 1990s, the legislature
continued adding to the list of offenses that would exclude a juvenile
from the juvenile court's jurisdiction. 132 These laws reflected a more
punitive and retributive attitude towards juvenile crime, ignoring any
13 3
difference between offenders and focusing on the act committed.
Near the end of the twentieth century, a juvenile could be tried in

criminal

court

under

three

statutory

provisions:

concurrent

36
35
jurisdiction,1 excluded jurisdiction,1 and transfer of jurisdiction. 1
In some of the jurisdiction provisions, the legislature gave the court
34

discretion over whether to prosecute a juvenile offender in juvenile or
criminal court; in others, the legislature categorically removed certain

129. Thomas F. Geraghty & Will Rhee, Learning from Tragedy: Representing Children in
DiscretionaryTransfer Hearings, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 595, 611 (1998); see People v. J.S.,
469 N.E.2d 1090 (I11. 1984) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute under a rational basis
test). Before Illinois excluded from juvenile jurisdiction offenders fifteen or older charged with
murder, armed robbery, or rape, an average of forty-seven cases were transferred per year through
a judicial transfer. Klein, supra note 465, at 390. In the two years after Illinois adopted the
automatic transfer statute, the average number of transfers more than tripled to 170. Id. Out of
those 170, 151 were from the automatic transfer statute. Id; see also Traver, supra note 81, at
289 (discussing how the Kent decision unwittingly led to the automatic transfer laws because
legislators thought "that the rehabilitative ideal endorsed by the Kent Court was flawed, and that
more punitive solutions for juvenile crime were necessary").
130. Geraghty & Rhee, supra note 129, at 602-03.
131. Traver, supra note 81, at 290. See People v. Reed, 465 N.E.2d 1040 (I11.App. Ct. 1984)
(upholding the constitutionality of the excluded jurisdiction statute).
132. See Traver, supra note 81, at 290-93 (discussing the legislation passed during this time
period). In 1985, the legislature added to the automatic transfer juveniles charged with drug or
weapons offenses around a school. Id. at 291. Then, in 1989, the legislature added gang-related
offenses. Id. at 290-91. In 1991, it added drug offenses in public housing to the automatic
transfer list. Id. at 292. Finally, in 1995, the legislature created a new type of transfer, the
presumptive transfer, for aggravated battery with a firearm. Id.
133. See In re R.L.L., 435 N.E.2d 904, 908 (III. App. Ct. 1982) (Webber, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority affirming the trial court's denial of a transfer motion (before
enactment of the automatic transfer laws) for a sixteen and one-half-year-old who allegedly
murdered his foster mother because "the trial court's emphasis on rehabilitation [is] out of line
with current public policy... [and] some cases... simply demand punishment").
134. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-125 (2006).
135. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
136. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1)-(3) (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
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juvenile offenders from the juvenile court's jurisdiction. 137 Concurrent
jurisdiction, for example, vests complete discretion in the state's
attorney. 138 If a juvenile allegedly violates a traffic, boating, or fish and
game law, both the juvenile court and the criminal court have
jurisdiction over the offense, allowing the state's attorney to file charges

in either court.

139

Excluded jurisdiction is similar to concurrent jurisdiction in that the
charges bypass the juvenile court, but differs because the state's
140
attorney has no discretion over in which court to file the charges.
The legislature has excluded certain groups of juvenile offenders from

the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 141

First, if a juvenile has

previously been convicted in criminal court, all future charges will be
filed in criminal court; the juvenile may no longer fall under the
juvenile court's jurisdiction. 142 In addition, excluded jurisdiction

automatically removes some juveniles from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court based only on age and offense. 14 3 The legislature
determined that juveniles over a certain age who have allegedly
committed certain crimes should be treated as adults, regardless of the
144
circumstances surrounding the crime.
137. Traver, supra note 81, at 295, 304-05 (discussing aggravated battery and the transfers
under the Juvenile Justice Reform Act).
138. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-125.
139. See People v. Bradley M., 815 N.E.2d 1209, 1210-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (discussing
concurrent jurisdiction and noting that the State may file charges against a juvenile in criminal
court for allegedly violating a traffic, boating, or fish and game law, but not a curfew violation).
Section 5-125 also authorizes a juvenile who has allegedly violated a municipal or county
ordinance to be tried in municipal courts. 705 ILL. COMP.STAT. 405/5-125; see City of Urbana
v. Andrew N.B., 813 N.E.2d 132, 138 (Ill.
2004) ("Thus, under section 5-125, the Cities could
pursue their own cases against the minors as an alternative to requesting the State commence
delinquency proceedings against them.").
140. Alma Tolliver, Comment, Juvenile Justice on the Brink of Another Failed Reform.
Where Do We Go FromHere?, 24 S.ILL. U. L.J. 569,582 (2000).
141. Id.
142. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(6) (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
143. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130.
144. For juveniles fifteen or over at the time of the offense, the excluded felonies include first
degree murder, aggravated criminal assault, aggravated battery with a firearm committed in or
around a school or school related activity, armed robbery with a firearm, or aggravated vehicular
hijacking with a firearm, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(l)(a), and unlawful use of a weapon
in or around a school, 705 ILL. COMP.STAT. 405/5-130(3)(a). Excluded jurisdiction also extends
to any minor who was at least thirteen at the time of the offense and is charged as a principal in
first degree murder committed during the course of criminal sexual assault or aggravated
kidnapping. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(4)(a); see People v. Clark, 518 N.E.2d 138, 143
(I1. 1987) ("We note with interest that the legislature itself balanced the competing interests of
minor offenders and society where it is alleged that a minor has committed 'murder, [or]
aggravated criminal sexual assault' and 'was at least 15 years of age' at the time of the alleged
offence. Under these circumstances, the legislature struck the balance in favor of societal security
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Finally, some charges that are initially filed in juvenile court may be
transferred to the criminal court. 145 Mandatory transfers are another
type of categorical exclusion, but they are slightly more individualized
than excluded jurisdiction because a judge must consider the juvenile's
prior history. 146 Instead of transferring all juveniles over fifteen years
of age based on the offense, a mandatory transfer applies to juveniles
with a prior felony record who allegedly committed a felony in
furtherance of gang activity, 147 and juveniles with a prior forcible
felony record who allegedly committed a Class X felony or aggravated
discharge of a firearm. 14 8 A mandatory transfer also applies to any
juvenile who allegedly committed aggravated discharge of a firearm in
or around a school, regardless of the minor's prior delinquency

history. 149
Discretion enters the system with the presumptive and discretionary
transfer. 150 When a juvenile fifteen years or older allegedly commits an
offense that subjects him to a presumptive transfer, a rebuttable
presumption exists that the minor will not benefit from being in the
juvenile system and should be transferred to the criminal court. 15 1 The
minor can rebut that presumption by showing with clear and convincing
evidence that he would be amenable to the services available in the
juvenile system. 152 In a discretionary transfer, available for any crime
allegedly committed by a juvenile thirteen years or older, no such
presumption exists. 153 Instead, the judge must find that it is not in the
54
best interests of the public to maintain juvenile jurisdiction. 1

by vesting exclusive jurisdiction over these alleged offenders within the criminal court.")
(citations omitted) (alteration in original).
145. See Traver, supra note 81, at 290-93 (describing the history of the automatic transfer
laws).
146. Id.
147. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(l)(a)-(b) (2006 & West Supp. 2007). If the current
alleged offense is a felony, the prior offense must have been a forcible felony. 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/5-805(1)(b). If the current alleged offense is a forcible felony, the prior offense need
only have been a felony. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(l)(a).
148. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(l)(c). Without a prior record, such an offense would
subject the minor to a presumptive, not mandatory, transfer. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5805(2)(a)-(b).
149. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1)(d).
150. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2) to -(3) (listing discretionary factors for a judge
to consider).
151. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(a).
152. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(b).
153. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-5/805(3)(a).
154. Id.
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When a judge exercises discretion, either during a presumptive
transfer or a discretionary transfer, the statute lists factors for the judge
to consider1 55 based on the factors listed in Kent. 156 The factors focus
on the seriousness of the offense, the minor's involvement in the
offense, the minor's background, whether the juvenile system has
services that may help the minor, and whether the juvenile system can
adequately punish the minor.157 In determining whether to transfer the
juvenile to adult court, the juvenile court places greater weight on the
seriousness of the alleged offense and the minor's prior record than on
158
other factors.
Illinois appellate cases suggest that transfer decisions are motivated
by how long the juvenile court will have jurisdiction over the juvenile
and whether that time is sufficient to rehabilitate the offender and

155. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-5/805(2)(b), (3)(b).
156. People v. Taylor, 391 N.E.2d 366, 370 (Ill. 1979) ("[T]he present [transfer] statute
closely parallels the District of Columbia transfer statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Kent. Indeed the council commentary to the new provision indicates that the statute was amended
in response to the Kent decision.").
157. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-5/805(2)(b), (3)(b). The factors are:
(i) the age of the minor;
(ii) the history of the minor, including:
(a) any previous delinquent or criminal history of the minor,
(b) any previous abuse or neglect history of the minor, and
(c) any mental health, physical, or educational history of the minor or
combination of these factors;
(iii) the circumstances of the offense, including:
(a) the seriousness of the offense,
(b) whether the minor is charged through accountability,
(c) whether there is evidence the offense was committed in an aggressive and
premeditated manner,
(d) whether there is evidence the offense caused serious bodily harm,
(e) whether there is evidence the minor possessed a deadly weapon;
(iv) the advantages of treatment within the juvenile justice system including whether
there are facilities or programs or both, particularly available in the juvenile system;
(v) whether the security of the public requires sentencing under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections:
(a) the minor's history of services, including the minor's willingness to participate
meaningfully in available services;
(b) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor can be rehabilitated
before the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction;
(c) the adequacy of the punishment or services.
Id. Interestingly, these factors were amended in 2005. 2005 Il. Laws 574. The previous factors
were similar, but less detailed. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(b), 3(b) (West 2004)
(amended 2005) (listing the previous factors).
158. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(b), 3(b).
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159
For example, in In re L.J., 160
adequately punish him for the offense.
the trial court denied the State's transfer motion, but the appellate court
reversed, focusing on a rationale of protecting the public. 16 1 Because
previous juvenile interventions had not been effective for L.J., the
appellate court held that the risk was too great to keep L.J. in the
juvenile system where he would be released upon reaching age twentyone. 162 In contrast, in People v. Booth, 16 3 although the judge noted that
juvenile facilities might benefit the defendant, the need to protect the
public tipped the scales in favor of the transfer. 164 The judge granted
the transfer because he had no reason to believe that the offender's
165
behavior would change before the juvenile court's jurisdiction ended.

The evolution of the transfer statute mirrors society's conceptions of
juvenile crime. 166 From the juvenile court's inception, the public did
167
not trust it to deal adequately with serious juvenile offenders.
Opponents of the juvenile court felt that some crimes were so serious
that the juvenile court could not adequately punish offenders within the
limited time frame that it exercised jurisdiction over them. 168 Further,
the public did not believe that the juvenile court could rehabilitate the
169
offenders or that the offenders necessarily deserved another chance.
Thus, the solution was increasingly to transfer such juveniles to criminal
court. 170

159. See Geraghty & Rhee, supra note 129, at 600-01 (identifying the normative question at
transfer hearing to be "given the seriousness of the offense and the background of the child,
should there be an effort to rehabilitate the child?").
160. In re L.J., 654 N.E.2d 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
161. Id. at 674.
162. Id.
163. People v. Booth, 637 N.E.2d 580 (111.App. Ct. 1994).
164. Id. at 583.
165. Id; see also People v. Morgan, 758 N.E.2d 813, 825 (11. App. Ct. 2001) ("[T]he [trial]
court observed that if [the defendant] should be convicted in juvenile court, he would be released
at age twenty-one whether or not he was rehabilitated.").
166. Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Justice Policy and Law: Applying Recent Social Science Findings
to Policy and Legislative Advocacy, 183 PRAC. L. INST./CRIM. 395, 397-98 (1999).
167. Kathleen A. Strottman, Note, Creating a Downward Spiral: Transfer Statutes and
Rebuttable Presumptions as Answers to Juvenile Delinquency, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 726
(1998).
168. Id. at 723.
169. Fagan, supra note 166, at 414-15 (detailing the belief that serious crimes deserve
punishment that a juvenile court may not be in the position to impose).
170. David O'Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not)
To Punish Minorsfor Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2004).
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III. DISCUSSION
In the decades leading to the 1998 reforms, the Illinois legislature
responded to juvenile crime by making the juvenile system more
punitive and by facilitating transfers to adult court. 17 1 Juvenile crime
appeared to be on the rise, and the public demanded more "get tough"
measures. 172 Many states reformed their juvenile justice systems in the
1990s, due in large part to media coverage depicting a juvenile crime
epidemic. 17 3 Media coverage surrounding some high profile cases drew
national attention to the juvenile justice system.174 The media depicted
juveniles as "superpredators"-criminals without remorse. 17 5 The
increased attention suggested an epidemic, but in reality, juveniles only
176
committed a small fraction of the total number of violent crimes.
Rather, the juvenile population was larger, so more juveniles entered the
system, giving the impression of a more serious crime epidemic than
existed in reality. 17 7 Even though the threats of superpredators were
directed
exaggerated, many states in the 1990s enacted legislation
17 8
adults.
as
juveniles
try
to
easier
it
making
them,
towards
Illinois, however, did not follow that trend. 179 The 1998 reforms
represented a shift away from the increasingly punitive trend of juvenile
justice. 180 The reforms embraced the philosophy of balanced and
restorative judgment, which attempts to balance the needs of the
offender with the harm done to the victim and the safety of the
community. 18 1 Unlike other states, Illinois did not change its transfer
17 1. See supra Part I.D. (discussing the new transfer laws).
172. DAVID L. MYERS, BOYS AMONG MEN: TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS
ADULTS 95-97 (2005).
173. Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymanski, State Legislative Responses to Violent Juvenile
Crime, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Programs, U.S. Dept. of
Justice), Nov. 1998, at 1. Between 1988 and 1994 the national juvenile violent crime arrest rate
increased 64% after remaining constant since the early 1970s. Id. at 2. Between the mid-1980s
and 1993, the number of juveniles arrested for murder more than doubled. Id.
174. Id. at 1.
175. Id. at 1-2.
176. Id. at 2. In 1986 juveniles were responsible for 9% of all violent crimes and 5% of all
murders. Id. In 1996, juveniles committed 13% of all violent crimes and 8% of all murders. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1-2.
179. See Traver, supra note 81, at 294 (describing how the Juvenile Justice Reform Act
shifted away from imposing automatic transfer provisions).
180. See Joseph E. Birkett, Juvenile Justice Reforms-County & State, DUPAGE COUNTY B.
ASS' NBRIEF ONLINE, Oct. 1999, availableat http://www.dcba.org/brief/octissue/1999/art31099
.htm (including an explanation of the 1998 reforms by one of the drafters, noting that the reforms
are not simply a "get tough" approach).
181. Daniel Dighton, Balanced and Restorative Justice in Illinois, ILL. CRIM. JUST.
AUTHORITY PUBLICATIONS, available at http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/icjia.txt.
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laws, but created a new statute providing for EJJ prosecutions, a
182
purported alternative to transfer.
This Part examines the effects of the 1998 reforms on the Illinois
juvenile justice system. 183 It demonstrates the compromise sought by
balanced and restorative justice between the putative singular goal of
rehabilitating the offender and the actual practice of a more punitive
aim. 184 It then describes the new EJJ provision, intended as an
alternative to transfer, and explains the statute's aim of giving the
offender one last chance to succeed in the juvenile system. 185 After
examining the legislative intent behind enacting the EJJ provision, this
Part discusses some uncertainties surrounding the EJJ revocation
procedure, including the process by which the juvenile loses the chance
186
to remain in the juvenile system and the adult sentence is executed.
It further explains two recent constitutional challenges to the EJJ
revocation process alleging that the process is unconstitutionally vague;
however, neither case was decided on the merits. 187 In those cases,
juveniles claimed that the statute does not provide a juvenile with notice
of how to conform his conduct to avoid the imposition of the adult
sentence, and that it does not provide the judge with any standard to use
in determining when to impose the adult sentence. 188 This Part
concludes with the open question of whether the EJJ revocation process
89
is void for vagueness. 1
A. The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998
Before 1998, the part of the Juvenile Court Act governing delinquent
minors did not have its own purpose statement; instead, the overarching
purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act applied, which governed

182. Traver, supra note 81, at 294-95.
183. See Birkett, supra note 180 (explaining that the 1998 reforms were not simply a "get
tough" approach).
184. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text (discussing balanced and restorative
justice, a philosophy that works to protect society, compensate the victim, and build the

offender's competency).
185. See infra notes 206-245 and accompanying text (detailing the EJJ process).
186. See infra notes 246-275 and accompanying text (finding that the legislative intent was to
provide serious juvenile offenders with one last chance in the juvenile system without laying out
the process in which a juvenile would lose that chance).
187. See infra notes 276-307 and accompanying text (discussing the two cases that have
challenged the constitutionality of the EJJ revocation process).
188. In re Christopher K., 841 N.E.2d 945, 951 (I11.2005); In re J.W., 804 N.E.2d 1094, 1103
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
189. In re Christopher K., 841 N.E.2d at 952 (showing that the Illinois Supreme Court refused
to determine the vagueness challenge because the case was moot).
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delinquent, dependent, and neglected or abused minors.1 90 Thus, the
purpose of the Juvenile Court Act was focused almost exclusively on
the best interests of the child.1 9 1
The 1998 Act changed the focus for delinquent minors by
incorporating the philosophy of balanced and restorative justice
("BARJ") in the article governing delinquent minors.1 92 BARJ is a
philosophy that seeks to balance the rehabilitative model of juvenile
justice with the punitive model. 193 In doing so, the BARJ model strives
to repair the harm to the victim, protect the community, and build the
competency of the offender. 194 To reflect these goals, the drafters
added a separate purpose statement governing the delinquency section
of the Juvenile Court Act, which serves to guide judges in interpreting
the 1998 Act. 195 The four main purposes of the 1998 Act are: (1) to
protect citizens; (2) to hold the juvenile accountable; (3) to build the
juvenile's competency; and (4) to provide the juvenile with procedural
due process. 19 6 The new policy statement no longer focuses solely on
rehabilitation, but also emphasizes public safety and personal
accountability. 197 The previous Juvenile Court Act did not have a

separate purpose statement governing delinquent minors, so this

190. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-1 to -34 (West 1996) (amended 1998).
191. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 1996) (amended 1998) ("The purpose of this Act is
to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own
home, as will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best
interests of the community.").
192. Phillip Stevenson, The Juvenile Justice Reform Act, ILL. CRIM. JUST. AUTH.: TRENDS &
ISSUES UPDATE (I11.Criminal Justice Information Authority), June 1999, at 1.
193. Id. at 1. The three main concepts behind BARJ are to "(1) hold each offender
accountable for his or her conduct, (2) have a mechanism in place that allows juvenile justice
professionals to intervene early in an offender's 'career,' and (3) increase the participation of the
community in the juvenile justice process, including the offender's victims." Id; see also
Geraghty & Rhee, supra note 129, at 595, 599-600 (discussing the unavoidable conflict between
punishment and rehabilitation when deciding whether to transfer a case to criminal court).
194. Stevenson, supra note 192, at 1; see Andrew R. Strauss, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian
Forestfor the Retributivist Trees: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian
Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 1549, 1587-89 (2002) (discussing BARJ as an
alternative to both the more criminalized juvenile justice system and the classic rehabilitative
model).
195. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101 (2006); see 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE
TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 16, 49 (11. Jan. 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Cross) (setting forth the
new balanced and restorative justice purpose of the bill).
196. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(1)(a)-(d). Rehabilitation is achieved by developing
competency through "educational, vocational, social, emotional and basic life skills which enable
a minor to mature into a productive member of society." 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(l)(c).
197. People v. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d 134, 139 (111. 2006).
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addition gives particular guidance to judges and attorneys who work in
98
the juvenile justice system.1
In addition to the new purpose statement, the 1998 reforms changed
the terminology used in juvenile court to parallel the terminology used
in criminal proceedings, 199 undoing some of the work done by the
Chicago Women's Club a century ago. 200 These changes, however,
were not made to criminalize the juvenile system, but to make the
process easier for lay people to understand. 20 1 Despite these changes,
rehabilitation, not punishment, continues to underlie the juvenile
system. 20 2 A juvenile adjudication is still distinct from a criminal
2 03
conviction.
B. EJJ Provisionsof the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998
The 1998 Act went further than merely distinguishing between
delinquent minors and abused or neglected minors. 2 °4 It also separated
serious, violent juvenile offenders from other juvenile offenders. 20 5 The
1998 Act created a distinct part, Part 8, within the delinquent minor
section, to govern the small number of juvenile offenders who commit
serious crimes. 20 6 Part 8, applicable only to serious and violent
offenders, contained its own purpose statement that emphasized
protection of the public as the main goal.20 7 Part 8 incorporated earlier
198.

Daniel Dighton, Balanced and Restorative Justice in Illinois, THE COMPILER, Winter

1999, at 4. One of the principal architects of the legislation said, "[The new purpose and policy
clause is] going to provide a lot more specific guidance to the judges, as well as others who work
in the system." Id; see also Geraghty & Rhee, supra note 129, at 614 ("Since legislatures know
that judges frequently examine the purpose of a statute to guide their interpretation, perhaps there
are no more explicit instructions to judges from the legislature than such statutory statements of
purpose and legislative findings.").
199. Now juveniles are "arrested" instead of "taken into custody" and have "trials," not
"adjudicatory hearings," and have "sentencing hearings" rather than "dispositional hearings."
Michelle M. Jochner, An Overview of the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisionsof 1998, 87 ILL. B.J.

152, 152 (1999).
200. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (explaining the change in terminology at
the adoption of the 1899 Juvenile Court Act).
201. Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, THE COMPILER (Chicago, I11.) Winter 1999, at 10-11
[hereinafter Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform].
202. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d at 141; see Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We

Get There?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 237 (1997) ("The ethic of the juvenile court is
to support children through adolescence as they mature out of patterns of impulsive behavior.
Sending children to adult court destroys this ethic of hope and patience.").
203. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d at 140.
204. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-801 (2006) (creating different categories of delinquent
minors).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. The purpose statement reads:
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provisions regarding violent and habitual juvenile offenders and the
transfer laws. 208 It also included
a new type of jurisdiction for juveniles
20 9
called EJJ prosecution.
Before the 1998 reforms, the Juvenile Court Act provided two
options for prosecuting juvenile offenders: (1) keeping the juvenile in
juvenile court, or (2) transferring the juvenile to criminal court where he
would remain for any future offenses. 2 10 Therefore, when a judge was
faced with a juvenile alleged to have committed a serious crime, he had
a choice between transferring the minor to the adult system, where the
minor essentially lost any chance for rehabilitation, 2 11 or keeping the
case in juvenile court. 2 12 If the minor remained in the juvenile system,
the judge took the risk that the juvenile would not be amenable to
rehabilitation services, yet in a few years would be out on the streets
after the juvenile court's jurisdiction expired.2 13 EJJ prosecutions offer
a third alternative, often described as "one last chance" for juvenile
2 14
offenders.

The General Assembly finds that a substantial and disproportionate amount of serious
crime is committed by a relatively small number of juvenile offenders ... and in all
proceedings under Sections 5-805, 5-810, and 5-815, the community's right to be
protected shall be the most important purpose of the proceedings.
Id. Section 5-805 governs how and when a minor may be transferred to adult criminal court.
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805 (2006 & West Supp. 2007). Section 5-815 governs habitual
juvenile offenders: those who have been adjudicated delinquent twice before for what would be a
felony if they had been prosecuted as adults. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-815 (2006 & West
Supp. 2007).
208. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805,-815,-820(2006 & West Supp. 2007).
209. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-801 to -820.
210. See Smallheer, supra note 68, at 276 ("The present choice available to juvenile court
judges adjudicating offenders presents an all-or-nothing decision: either keeping the individual in
the juvenile system, or placing him in the adult criminal system.").
211. See Klein, supra note 45, at 403 (discussing the loss of rehabilitative opportunities to
transferred juveniles, including access to educational and therapeutic services, psychological and
educational counseling, and job training).
212. People v. Clark, 518 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Ill. 1987) ("[T]he choice is between two extremes,
incarceration to age twenty-one under the [Juvenile] Act or incarceration for life without
possibility of parole under the Criminal Code .... ").
213. See Brummer, supra note 73, at 788 ("Of great concern to courts has been the juvenile
who engages in reprehensible crimes or who is not amenable to rehabilitation within the time
prescribed for juvenile court jurisdiction."); Geraghty, supra note 202, at 227 ("The perceived,
and sometimes real, need to provide long-term incarceration for the small minority of children
who must be institutionalized could be satisfied by the 'blended sentencing' schemes.").
214. Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kara Rafferty, Juvenile Law Developments- "One Last
Chance": Applying Adult Standards to Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Proceedings-State v.
B.Y., 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 427,431-32 (2003) (describing the reasons behind Minnesota's
EJJ provision as "one last chance . . . to give deserving juveniles an opportunity to change
through treatment in the juvenile system"); see Mary E. Spring, Comment, Extended Jurisdiction
Juvenile Prosecution:A New Approach to the Problem of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J.
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EJJ prosecutions are a type of "blended sentences," a trend in
juvenile justice, adopted by over one-third of states, which allow
juvenile courts more sentencing options. 2 15 Six different models have
emerged. 2 16 In the juvenile-exclusive model, the juvenile court may
impose either an adult sentence or a juvenile sentence on certain repeat
and/or serious offenders. 2 17 In the juvenile-inclusive model, the juvenile
court imposes both a juvenile and an adult sentence; the adult sentence
is stayed and vacated if the juvenile sentence is successfully
completed. 2 18 A juvenile under the juvenile-contiguous model may
receive a juvenile sentence that extends beyond his eighteenth birthday,
after which the court holds a hearing to determine whether to transfer
the juvenile to the adult system or release him.2 19 Other states have
blended sentencing options in the criminal court instead of the juvenile
court. 220 The criminal-exclusive model permits a criminal court to
impose an adult sentence or a juvenile sentence, while the criminalinclusive model permits both an adult sentence and a juvenile
sentence. 22 1 Finally, New York has a model for adolescents in criminal
court in which the criminal sentence is suspended while the juvenile
participates in an alternative to an incarceration program. 222 Successful
juveniles avoid a criminal sentence. 22 3 The overall purpose of blended
sentencing is to allow juveniles who have committed serious crimes, but
may still be amenable to services, to have a chance to remain in juvenile

MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1374-75 (1998) (discussing the negative consequences of sentencing a
juvenile who is amenable to treatment to adult court).
215. Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile
Courts, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 146, 149.
216. See id., at 151 (describing five basic models of blended sentencing); MICHAEL A.
CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN 54-55 (2006) (discussing how New York's
Youthful Offender paradigm is similar to blended sentencing).
217. Redding & Howell, supra note 215, at 151. Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Mexico
follow the juvenile-exclusive model. Id.
218. Id. at 152; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(7) (2006 & West Supp. 2007). Connecticut,
Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, and Illinois follow the juvenile-inclusive model. Redding &
Howell, supra note 215, at 152; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(7).
219. Redding & Howell, supra note 215, at 152. Colorado, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Texas have the juvenile-contiguous model. Id.
220. Id. at 153.
221. Id. The criminal-exclusive model is found in California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Michigan, Oklahoma, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. Colorado and Michigan have both the
criminal- and juvenile-exclusive model. Id. The criminal-inclusive model exists in Arkansas,
Iowa, Missouri, and Virginia. Id. Vermont has a hybrid of extended juvenile jurisdiction beyond
eighteen and suspended adult sentences. Id. The adult court imposes both an adult sentence and
a juvenile sentence, then transfers jurisdiction to the family court. Id.
222. CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 157.
223. Id. at 144.
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court, receive needed services that would be unavailable to them in
224
adult court, and avoid the stigma of an adult conviction.
In Illinois, EJJ prosecutions are an option if a minor over thirteen
years old is alleged to have committed an offense that would be a felony
if committed by an adult. 22 5 The state's attorney may file a petition to
designate the proceeding as an EJJ prosecution at any time before the
trial begins. 226 If the juvenile court judge finds probable cause that the
allegations are true, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
proceeding shall be designated as an EJJ proceeding. 22 7
The
presumption can be overcome by a finding based on clear and
convincing evidence 228 that an adult sentence would not be appropriate
for the minor. 2 29 When making that determination, the judge must
consider factors similar to those used in transfer hearings, which focus
on the minor's background, the seriousness of the offense, and the
minor's involvement in the offense. 230 Analogous to the transfer
statutes, the most important factors are the seriousness of the alleged
offense and the minor's prior record of delinquency. 2 3 1 The EJJ statute
is further similar to the transfer statute in that the same offenders who
are eligible for an EJJ designation are also eligible for a presumptive
transfer. 232 Therefore, an EJJ designation means that the judge
determined that the minor is amenable to the services in the juvenile

224. Redding & Howell, supra note 215, at 172.
225. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(1) (2006), amended by Act of Aug. 21, 2007, 11. Legis.
Serv. 95-301 (West), 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(1 )(a).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Clear and convincing evidence is a standard of proof between preponderance of the
evidence, used in civil trials, and beyond a reasonable doubt, used in criminal trials. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 577 (8th ed. 2004). The evidence must indicate that "the thing to be proved is
highly probable or reasonably certain." Id.
229. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(1)(b) (West 2004), amended by 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-810(1)(b) (West Supp. 2005).
230. Id. These factors were recently amended in 2005 to copy the transfer statute. See supra
note 157 for the statutory factors a judge must consider.
231. Id; cf supra note 157 (listing the factors for a discretionary transfer).
232. Both EJJ and discretionary transfers apply to minors who were thirteen or older at the
time of the alleged offense. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3) (2006 & West Supp. 2007); 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(1) (2006), amended by Act of Aug. 21, 2007, Ill. Legis. Serv. 95301 (West), 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(1)(a). Discretionary transfers are available for
"any crime," while EJJ designations are limited to felonies. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3);
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(1) (2006), amended by Act of Aug. 21, 2007, I11.Legis. Serv.
95-301 (West), 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-8 10(l)(a).
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system or that the adult system is otherwise inappropriate for the
233
offender.
An EJJ juvenile has the right to a jury trial because the potential for
an adult sentence exists.2 34 If the minor pleads guilty or is found guilty
after trial, the judge imposes two sentences: a juvenile sentence in
accordance with section 5-710 of the Juvenile Court Act and an adult
criminal sentence in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections. 235 The adult sentence is stayed and the
minor serves the juvenile sentence. 2 36 If the minor successfully
completes the juvenile sentence, the adult sentence is vacated. 237 If,
however, the minor violates the conditions of the sentence or commits a
23 8
new offense, the adult sentence may be imposed.
The drafters of the EJJ statute looked to the juvenile probation
revocation hearings as a model for EJJ revocation. 2 39 After the State
learns of an alleged violation, it must file a petition to revoke the stay of
the adult sentence based on the alleged violation. 240 The court then
241
conducts a hearing, and if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the minor committed a new offense, it must impose the adult
sentence. 242 If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the minor violated a condition of his sentence, other than by committing
a new offense, it has several options. 24 3 The court may continue the
existing juvenile sentence with or without modifying the conditions, or

233. Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver Reform,
"Blended Sentencing," and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 997, 1011 (2001).
234. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(3). Juveniles in Illinois under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court do not have the right to a jury trial. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-605(1) (2006).
Only certain proceedings, those in which the juvenile has the possibility of receiving an adult
sentence, allow the juvenile the right to a jury trial. Id; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1976) (holding that juveniles have no constitutional right to a jury trial).
235. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5- 8 10(4) (2006), amended by Act of Aug. 21, 2007, 111. Legis.
Serv. 95-301 (West), 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(4).
236. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(4)(ii).
237. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(7) (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
238. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6) (2006), amended by 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 95331 (West).
239. Timothy Lavery, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecutions in Illinois, ON GOOD
AUTHORITY, Dec. 2002, at 4.
240. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6).
241. Preponderance of the evidence is the standard used in most civil trials. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1201 (8th ed. 2004). The winning party must have the stronger evidence, "however
slight the edge may be." Id.
242. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6).
243. Id.
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it may order execution of the previously-imposed adult sentence. 244 If
the court orders the adult sentence, it transfers jurisdiction over the

minor to the adult criminal court and the juvenile court jurisdiction over
the minor 5is terminated for that offense as well as for any future

offenses.

24

1. Legislative Intent in Enacting EJJ
The EJJ provision is a significant change to the juvenile court's

jurisdiction, but the 1998 reforms of the juvenile justice system
originally did not include the EJJ provision. 246 After the bill passed the
Illinois Senate, the Illinois House added an amendment that included the

EJJ provision. 247 The original EJJ provision provided that upon finding
that a minor committed a new offense or violated a condition of his
sentence, the court must impose the adult sentence, leaving the court no
discretion.248
During the legislative debates, the bill sponsor explained that the EJJ

provision was directed towards juveniles who were subject to the
presumptive transfer laws and was designed to give a juvenile an
additional chance to take advantage of the rehabilitative services of the
juvenile system. 249 The potential adult sentence acted as a threat
hanging over the juvenile's head to assure that the juvenile would take
advantage of the juvenile services and avoid committing other
offenses. 250 One representative supported the idea of EJJ because it
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. S.B. 0363,90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (I11.1997).
247. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Jan. 27, 1998, at 191-92. The House
Sponsor, Representative Cross, in describing EJJ to the representatives, said, "We are creating a
creature known as 'blended sentencing' . . . where we will sentence a juvenile to a traditional
juvenile sentence, but at the same time, give that juvenile an adult sentence. If the juvenile does
not complete the juvenile sentence as he or she is ordered, then the adult sentence will be put into
place." 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 15-16 (I11. Jan. 27, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Cross).
248. The relevant part read:
When it appears that a minor convicted in an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution
under subsection (1) has violated the conditions of his or her sentence, or is alleged to
have committed a new offense upon the filing of a petition to revoke the stay, the court
may, without notice, issue a warrant for the arrest of the minor. After a hearing, if the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations in the petition to
revoke the stay of execution of the adult sentence have been proven, the court shall
order execution of the previously imposed adult criminal sentence.
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Jan. 27, 1998, at 192.
249. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 33 (I11. Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Hawkinson).
250. Id. at 35 (statement of Sen. Hawkinson).
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gave the young offender an opportunity to turn around and become a
25 1
model citizen.
Some members of the legislature, however, raised concerns about the
EJJ provision. 252 One representative argued that EJJ would keep
juveniles in the system longer, despite the fact that juvenile systems
state-wide lacked the resources or programs to effectively care for the
physical and mental health needs of the juveniles. 2 53 A member of the
Illinois Senate feared that, without adequate services in place, EJJ
254
would send more children to the adult system through the back door.
Another representative expressed doubts regarding whether the
suspended adult sentence would actually affect future criminal behavior
because children do not think about future consequences in the same
manner as adults. 255 Further, another senator objected to judges' lack of
discretion in imposing the adult sentence. 256 He did not believe that all
violations of the sentence conditions should trigger the adult
sentence. 257 He argued that there was a huge difference between
committing another felony while on probation and, for example,
25 8
missing an appointment with a probation officer.
251. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 26 (i11. Jan. 27, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Lang) ("The ideas in here regarding blended sentences ... are fabulous ideas
in terms of going directly to these young offenders and saying, 'This is your opportunity to turn
around. We've created a system for you, so that you can turn around and we will help you turn
around to be the kind of citizens you would like to be, the kind of citizens that would make your
parents proud, the kind of citizens that will be model citizens for our state."').
252. See infra notes 253-258 and accompanying text (listing objections).
253. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 18 (Il. Jan. 27, 1998)
(statement of Rep. M. Davis).
254. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 12-13 (Ill.
Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Obama) ("If, in fact, we are creating a system where we're going to give young
people an adult sentence and a juvenile sentence at the same time, then we are obliged to make
sure, as much as possible, that they're going to be successful in carrying out that juvenile
sentence. If we don't do that, if we don't provide the services to allow them to complete a
juvenile sentence successfully, then this bill, essentially, will result in more incarcerations of
young people .... [I]f we don't have the funding in place, then this, essentially, is a bill that will
permit, or facilitate through the backdoor, additional incarcerations of young people, and ... I
don't think is the intent of the bill.").
255. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 19 (I11.
Jan. 27, 1998)
(statement of Rep. M. Davis) ("Do you know that kids don't know the ramifications of their
behavior from now until tomorrow, but you want them to think that they'd better do this as a
child because that'll happen to them when they become adults? Psychologists, psychiatrists,
teachers, parents will tell you, children don't think that way.").
256. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 34-35 (il1. Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Molaro).
257. Id.
258. Id. ("Now, you're right when you say normally, or most of the times, they go out and
commit another offense. That's great. Go out and commit an offense while you're on probation,
maybe... the stay should be lifted. But what if it's not that you did another sentence [sic]? What
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In response to the concern over violations that trigger the adult
sentence, the bill's sponsor focused on the layers of discretion built into
the statute. 25 9 Although any violation could trigger the adult sentence, a
probation officer must first feel that the violation was serious enough to
warrant the adult sentence. 260 Next, the state's attorney has to agree
with the probation officer and file the petition.2 6 1 Finally, the juvenile
court judge has to find that there was a violation, prior to imposing the
adult sentence. 2 62 In the discussion, some of the contemplated
violations included: not completing a drug or alcohol program, not
completing community service, not staying in school, not staying at
home during home confinement, missing an appointment with a
counselor, or failing to meet a probation officer. 263 The debate stressed
that the purpose of EJJ was not to send a juvenile to the Department of
26 4
Corrections following a minor violation.
Governor Jim Edgar did not sign the bill. 2 65 Instead, he submitted an
amendatory veto that revised the contentious portion of the EJJ
statute.266 The amendment still provided that the judge must impose the
if it's that you missed seeing your counselor? You didn't report to your probation officer?
Because it's clear in the Statute ... that it talks about any violation of the sentence, and then it
talks about that it's brought and the judge hears whether or not it's a violation. So missing seeing
your counselor is a violation. Not seeing your probation officer is a violation. And it says, then,
the... judge must lift the stay order and sentence them. The judge has no discretion to say 'Wait
a second. He missed his probation officer. I'm not going to lift it.' A violation is a violation. So
I just want to make sure that if we're going to put it in the hands of judges out there, we're going
to put it in the hands of State's Attorneys, that there's some intent that committing another felony
while you're on felony probation is one thing, but not seeing your probation officer or missing the
date is another.").
259. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 35 (Ill.
Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Hawkinson) ("[T]here's a lot of discretion built into this.").
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 35 (Ill. Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Molaro).
264. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 36 (I11.
Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Molaro); see also, 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE
35 (Jan. 29, 1998, Il1.) (statement of Sen. Hawkinson) (discussing the amount of discretion
numerous state officers have in deciding whether a violation warrants lifting the suspended
sentence). This purpose conflicts with the statutory language that any violation would result in
the adult sentence.
265. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE (I11.), Apr. 28, 1998, at 1366.
266. Id. He described the EJJ provision as follows:
SB 363 creates a new blended sentencing option for minors otherwise eligible to be
considered for discretionary transfer to adult court. The blended sentence allows the
court to impose a juvenile sentence and a suspended adult sentence on a minor found
delinquent. If the minor violates any provision of the juvenile sentence, the adult
sentence will be imposed resulting in an adult criminal conviction record.
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249

adult sentence if the minor commits a new offense. 26 7 However, if the
minor violated the sentence by committing a technical or minor
violation, the judge would have discretion to impose the adult sentence
or continue the juvenile sentence. 2 68 The Illinois Senate interpreted the
amendment to mean that a judge is not required to impose the adult
sentence for non-willful or technical violations. 269 However, the
amendment did not contain any criteria to guide the judge in deciding
when to impose the adult sentence. 2 70 The legislature enacted the
governor's amendment, which became the current EJJ statute, requiring
after a new offense, but
the mandatory imposition of the adult sentence
271
allowing discretion for other violations.
According to the legislative history, the legislature defined "offense"
as a violation of the criminal law and mandated that the adult sentence
must be imposed if the offense is proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. 2 72 However, the judge would have complete discretion for
other violations. 27 3 Although mere technical, non-willful, or minor
violations were not supposed to trigger the adult sentence, legislators
suggested leaving one's home during home confinement and failing to
attend school as possible violations that could trigger the adult
sentence. 274 Still, the overall purpose of the EJJ proceeding was to
ensure that the juvenile would take the juvenile sentence seriously,
275
participate in services, and not commit other crimes.

Id. at 1367 (quoting letter from the governor).
267. Id.
268. Id. The new part would read:
After a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor
committed a violation of his or her sentence other than by a new offense, the court may
order execution of the previously imposed adult sentence or may continue him or her
on the existing juvenile sentence with or without modifying or enlarging the
conditions.
Id. at 1369 (quoting from the governor's letter).
269. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE I1 (I11. May 5, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Hawkinson). With the governor's changes, the bill passed the senate
unanimously, 57-0-0. Id. at 15 (statement of Sen. Donahue).
270. See JOURNAL OF THE SENATE (II1.), Apr. 28, 1998, at 1364-67 (no factors listed in the

amendment).
271. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE I1 (Ill. May 5, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Hawkinson); Id. at 15 (statement of Sen. Donahue).
272. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 9-10 (Il1. Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Hawkinson).
273. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (explaining the judge's discretion in deciding
to revoke a juvenile sentence or continue it with or without modifying the terms of the sentence).
274. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 9-10 (I11. Jan. 29, 1998)

(statement of Sen. Hawkinson).
275. Id.
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2. Challenges to the EJJ Statute's Constitutionality
Since its enactment, two Illinois cases have challenged the
constitutionality of the revocation process in the EJJ statute. 2 76 The
277
first, In re J. W, the case discussed at the beginning of this Comment,
involved a thirteen-year-old girl charged with first-degree murder for
allegedly killing her mother and found guilty in the subsequent EJJ
proceeding. 278 On appeal, she claimed that the EJJ statute was
unconstitutionally vague for two reasons. 27 9 First, she argued that it did

not provide notice as to what acts constituted violations that would
trigger the adult sentence. 2 80 Second, she argued that the judge had no
guidance in deciding whether to impose the adult sentence or to
continue the juvenile sentence. 2 8 1 The appellate court, however, did not
reach the merits of the claim because it determined that J.W. lacked
standing. 282 J.W. did not have standing because she had not yet
suffered a direct injury from the statute, nor was she in immediate
danger of injury because the adult sentence had not yet been
imposed.28 3 In fact, the adult sentence would never be imposed if J.W.
successfully completed her juvenile sentence. 2 84 Thus, while In re J. W
first raised concerns regarding the constitutionality of the statute, the
2 85
court did not resolve the case on the merits.
In a subsequent case, fourteen-year-old Christopher K. was tried and
found guilty of first degree murder in an EJJ proceeding. 2 86 On appeal,
276. In re J.W., 804 N.E.2d 1094 (Il1. App. Ct. 2004); In re Christopher K., 810 N.E.2d 145
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004), affid in part, 841 N.E.2d 945 (Il1. 2005) [hereinafter In re ChristopherK. 1];
In re Christopher K. 841 N.E.2d 945 (I11.2005) [hereinafter In re ChristopherK. II].
277. See supra Part I (detailing the murder and J.W.'s subsequent trial).
278. In re J.W., 804 N.E.2d at 1096.
279. Id. at 1103.
280. Id.
281. Id. J.W. also argued that the EJJ designation violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000), because the judge did not make a finding determining an EJJ proceeding beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the judge abused his discretion in designating her case as an EJJ
proceeding because she was only thirteen and it was her first offense. In re J.W., 804 N.E.2d at
1101. The appellate court held that the EJJ designation did not violate Apprendi because that
designation did not purport to establish any element of the crime of first-degree murder. Id. at
1102. In addition, the judge did not abuse his discretion in designating the proceeding as an EJJ
prosecution instead of a normal juvenile proceeding because, although it was J.W.'s first offense,
she stabbed her mother over 200 times with three different knives. Id. at 1105-07. The
seriousness of the offense and her culpability overrode her age and lack of prior offenses. Id. at
1107.
282. In re J.W., 804 N.E.2d at 1105.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1103.
285. Id. at 1105.
286. In re ChristopherK. 1, 810 N.E.2d 145, 150 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
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he questioned the constitutionality of the EJJ proceedings, based on a
similar argument to that in In re J.W 28 7 Christopher K. argued that
juveniles do not have adequate notice of prohibited conduct and that
courts have no standards to use in deciding whether to impose the adult
sentence.288 He argued that the EJJ provision did not define what "new
offense" would trigger the adult sentence and did not clearly state the
standard to which he must conform to avoid the imposition of the adult
sentence. 289 The statute also did not give the court any standards to
determine when to execute the adult sentence after a violation has been
proven. 290 Thus, he claimed the statute was unconstitutional on its
29 1
face.
Christopher K. further argued that the statute was vague as applied to
him. 292 In Illinois, a person cannot be held responsible for violating a
statute unless he reasonably could be expected to know, in light of the
particular facts of his case, that his conduct was proscribed. 2 93 At
Christopher K.'s sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced him to the
Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division ("JDOC"), then asked the
attorneys their opinions on "'what the provisions of the juvenile
sentence would be for a commitment to the Department of Corrections,
speculating that perhaps there was a requirement 'that he stay there and
not leave.' '"294 Neither the State nor the defense articulated any acts
that could trigger the adult sentence during a commitment to the
JDOC. 295 Further, the trial court did not attempt to clarify the
uncertainty by specifying any conditions that would trigger the adult
sentence;296 the judge also agreed that the statute provided no
guidance.297 Thus, Christopher K. began his juvenile sentence without
29 8
knowing what he had to do to avoid triggering the adult sentence.
287. See supra notes 274-281 and accompanying text (discussing J.W.'s case).
288. In re ChristopherK. 1, 810 N.E.2d at 158. The other issues were whether the prosecutor
could file a petition for an EJJ prosecution after her petition for a discretionary transfer to adult
court was denied, whether Christopher's statements were voluntary, whether he asked for a
lawyer, and ineffectiveness of counsel. Id. at 153-57, 160-67.

289. Id. at 158.
290. Id.
291.
292.
293.
294.
K., 841

Id.
Id.
People v. Garrison, 412 N.E.2d 483, 488-89 (Ill. 1980).
Brief and Argument of Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 15, In re Christopher
N.E.2d 945 (II1. 2005) (No. 99JD730) (quoting the judge presiding over the appellant's

sentencing hearing) [hereinafter Christopher K.'s Brief].
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 16.
In re ChristopherK. 1, 810 N.E.2d 145, 158 (II1.App. Ct. 2004).
Christopher K.'s Brief, supra note 294, at 16.
Id. at 17.
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Christopher K. argued that the vagueness surrounding the elements of
the EJJ statute undermined its two main goals: rehabilitating youth and
protecting the community. 2 99 The appellate court disagreed.3 °° It held
that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, concluding that
offense means "something that would, if done without any previous
history, subject a minor to a juvenile sentence," but limited "offense" to
30 1
a criminal offense defined in the criminal code.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.30 2 On appeal,
Christopher K. again raised the constitutionality of the EJJ statute on
vagueness grounds. 30 3 However, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the mootness doctrine precluded it from addressing the vagueness
claim. 30 4 Christopher K. had reached the age of twenty-one by the time
of the appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. 30 5 Because he had
successfully completed his juvenile sentence, the adult sentence was
vacated. 30 6 Therefore, the constitutionality of the provisions governing
30 7
the imposition of the adult sentence remains uncertain.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Although the Illinois Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the
EJJ revocation procedure is void for vagueness, subsequent cases are
likely to raise the issue if an EJJ juvenile's adult sentence is
executed. 30 8 Both In re Christopher K. and In re J. W. suggest that the
Illinois Supreme Court will probably not entertain a facial challenge to
the EJJ revocation procedure. 30 9 The statute, however, may be

299. Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of the RespondentAppellee at 26-30, In re Christopher K., 841 N.E.2d 945 (I11.2005) (No. 99JD739) [hereinafter
Amici Brief].
300. In re ChristopherK. 1, 810 N.E.2d at 160-61.
301. Id.
302. The main issue on appeal was whether the State could seek an EJJ designation after a
discretionary transfer was denied. In re ChristopherK. II, 841 N.E.2d 945, 949 (Ill. 2005).
303. Id. at 950.
304. Id. at 952.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See id. (refusing to rule on the validity of the EJJ statute because the issue was moot).
308. See, e.g. TIMOTHY LAVERY ET AL., AN IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM PROVISIONS OF 1998: PART TWO: CASE STUDIES OF NEW OR

CHANGED JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM PROCESSES 77 (I11. Juvenile Justice Comm'n 2002)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART Two] (showing an example of an EJJ
juvenile who challenged the constitutionality of the EJJ statute after his adult sentence was
executed, but decided to drop the appeal).
309. See John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in
American CriminalLaws, 80 DENy. U. L. REV. 241, 281 (2002) (noting that courts generally do
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susceptible to an as-applied challenge. 3 10 Yet, regardless of whether it
is constitutional, the EJJ statute is not designed to provide juveniles
311
with the best chance to succeed in the juvenile system.
As written, the EJJ statute has two main flaws: the statute does not
specify how to carry out the purpose of protecting the public and the
revocation procedure is unclear. 3 12 This Part argues that, although the
stated purpose behind Part 8 is to protect the public, the legislature has
failed to clarify how the courts should carry out that objective. 3 13 This
Part then discusses why the revocation procedure, as written, is not
designed to maximize the number of juveniles who can avoid their adult
3 14
sentence.

A. The Legislature'sPurpose of Protectingthe Public Is Not WellDefined
Studies support the legislature's conclusion, embodied in the purpose
statement of Part 8, that most of the serious juvenile crimes are
3 15
committed by a relatively small number of juvenile offenders.
Therefore, focusing on these offenders should aid in protecting the
public. 3 16 Unfortunately, previous trends in the juvenile justice system
suggest that many people assume that to best protect the public the
dangerous juveniles must be punished more severely to deter them from

not hear facial vagueness challenges to statutes that do not involve First Amendment issues). A
facial challenge claims the statute is incapable of any constitutional application. Id. at 275.
310. Cf Phaedra Athena O'Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis of
First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions, 77
N.C. L. REV. 783, 846-52 (1999) (discussing ways to challenge the constitutionality of probation
conditions, focusing on as-applied challenges).
311. See infra Part IV.B.2.a (discussing what juveniles would need from a developmental
perspective to successfully complete their juvenile sentences).
312. See infra Part IV.A-IV.B. (explaining why the purpose and revocation procedure are
unclear).
313. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-801(1) (2006 & West Supp. 2007) (including no
explanation on how to carry out the purpose statement).
314. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how the EJJ statute could be more effective).
315. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-801; see, e.g., ROBERT D. HOGE, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER
21 (2001) (listing studies that confirm that "much of the serious crime in a community is
committed by a small group of high-risk offenders").
316. Brent Pollitt, Buying Justice on Credit Instead of Investing in Long-Term Solutions:
Foreclosing on Trying Juveniles in Criminal Court, 6 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 281, 293 (2004). A
California study concluded that only a small percentage of juveniles recidivate, and even a small
reduction in recidivism rates for those juveniles could have a huge impact. Id. Focusing on these
particular juveniles early on can reduce future crime. Id.
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3 17
committing other crimes and to set an example for other juveniles.
By extension, they believe juveniles must be treated as adults because
the juvenile system cannot adequately punish them in the limited years

during which it has jurisdiction, thereby lessening the seriousness of the

offense and not teaching the offender an adequate lesson. 3 18 However,
demand to "get
that assumption is predominantly based on the public's
3 19
tough" on juveniles rather than on empirical research.
In most cases, keeping juveniles in the juvenile system better protects

society than transferring them to adult court. 320 For instance, juveniles
transferred to the adult system are more likely to become repeat

offenders sooner and reoffend more often than juveniles who remain in
the juvenile system. 32 1 Also, transferred juveniles are more likely to
commit felony offenses in the future. 3 22 Furthermore, research shows
that juvenile court treatment programs are more effective in
rehabilitating the offender than either incarceration in adult prison or
juvenile training schools. 3 23 This is, in part, because the juvenile
system focuses on rehabilitation, but also because the juvenile forms

317. David P. Farrington & Rolf Loeber, Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders, in A
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 206, 226-27 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
Between 1987 and 1994, tougher penalties, including prosecution in adult court, an increase in
number of delinquency cases judicially waived to the adult court, felony convictions of juveniles
transferred to adult courts, and "blended sentencing" models, increased substantially in many
states. Id.
318. See MYERS, supra note 126, at 3 ("In general, it is believed that these youthful offenders
[transferred to adult court] will receive harsher treatment in adult court, which in turn will have a
beneficial impact on juvenile crime, through both greater deterrence and longer incapacitation.").
319. See Fagan & Zimring, supra note 67, at 2 ("When very serious crimes by youth are a
focus of public concern, laws about transfer to criminal court jurisdiction are the most likely
Without exception, [forty states passed] new laws...
legislative response to that concern ....
designed to expand the number and kind of cases where transfer occurs .... "); Traver, supra note
81, at 308-09 (describing how the Illinois General Assembly passed another automatic transfer
law in 1999 in response to a highly publicized school shooting, despite opposition based on the
ineffectiveness of transfer provisions).
320. Pollitt, supra note 316, at 284 ("Unquestionably, society possesses a vested interest in
protecting its members from juvenile offenders. Society also possesses an undeniable interest in
holding juvenile offenders accountable for their actions. Treating juvenile offenders as adults and
transferring them to criminal court, however, fails to best serve either of these interests.").
321. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 227, 261 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000)
(discussing three major findings from studies comparing rates of recidivism among youths
transferred to criminal court and youths retained in the juvenile system as: (1) transferred youths
are likely to reoffend more often and more quickly, (2) that these different effects are not
dependent on sentence types or length, and (3) the risk of reoffense is aggravated when
incarceration is imposed).
322. Klein, supra note 45, at 403.
323. Geraghty, supra note 202, at 204 n.25.
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more positive relationships with staff in the juvenile system. 32 4 A
further problem with incarceration is that it inhibits a juvenile's chance
to reintegrate into society because the juvenile loses contact with family

members and his community while serving his sentence. 325 Juveniles
also tend to become more involved with gangs while in adult prison
than in juvenile institutions because they fear older, bigger inmates and
seek protection. 326
Finally, juvenile institutions offer superior
educational opportunities compared to adult institutions. 327 Although
the goal of public safety is served in the short term by imposing an adult
sentence on a juvenile and keeping him off the streets longer, the longterm effects actually decrease public safety. 32 8 When the juvenile is
released, he will have less education and fewer ties to family and the
3 29
community, but more knowledge about gangs and prison life.
Ultimately, most juvenile offenders will leave prison and return to
society with more knowledge of criminal behavior than before they
330
entered.
The only advantage of the adult system over the juvenile system is
that the adult system can retain control over the juvenile longer,
maintaining jurisdiction over the offender beyond the age of twentyone. 3 3 1 Yet, when compared to the adult system, the juvenile system
has better educational and vocational programs, better access to therapy,
smaller detention facilities, and staff who are better trained to work with

324. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 321, at 261-62 (saying one of the reasons juveniles in the
juvenile system have a lower probability of reoffending may be because the juvenile system
communicates a message of caring); see also Geraghty, supra note 202, at 203 ("[A]n individual
or a program that forges a relationship with a child has a good chance of succeeding.").
325. Geraghty, supra note 202, at 207.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 207-08.
328. Id. at 207 n.35 (discussing James C. Howell, Juvenile Transfers to the CriminalJustice
System: State-of-the Art, 18 J.L. & Pol'y 58-60 (1996)).
329. Id. at 207.
330. See Pollitt, supra note 316, at 291 ("The average juvenile offender receiving a prison
sentence returns to the streets before age thirty."); Geraghty, supra note 202, at 209 n.42 ("Unless
society intends to lock up every child who enters the justice system for the rest of his or her life, it
must [be] acknowledged that these children will ultimately re-enter society." (quoting Catherine
R. Guttman, Listen to the Children: The Decision to TransferJuveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507,509 (1995))).
331. Comment, When the Punishment Cannot Fit the Crime: The Case for Reforming the
Juvenile Justice System, 52 ARK. L. REV. 563, 564 (1999) (discussing the problem in the juvenile
justice system of not retaining jurisdiction long enough to adequately punish the offender); see
Brianna M. Sinon, Failing Girls: A Cure Worse than the Disease-Charging, Trying and
Sentencing Female Juvenile Offenders as Adults, 7 HOW. SCROLL SOC. JUST. L. REV. 32, 40
(2004) ("[Jluvenile offenders . . . should not enter the adult criminal justice system at any
point.").
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juveniles. 332 Juveniles in adult prison, on the other hand, are more
likely to commit suicide and are at greater risk of being beaten by staff
or being sexually assaulted by other inmates. 3 33 However, the juvenile
court loses jurisdiction over the offender at age twenty-one and must
release the offender, regardless of the threat that he may still pose to
society. 334 In a few cases, therefore, long-term incapacitation may truly
be necessary to protect society. 335 In the other cases, delinquent

behavior is a youthful phenomenon and will pass with age, but may
intensify if the youth is transferred to the adult system. 336 Therefore,
judges should not assume that protecting the public requires that an
in all cases-it should be applied only in the
adult sentence be imposed
3 37
most egregious ones.
Although the clear purpose of Part 8 is to protect the public, the
statute fails to specify what that means when applied to EJJ
proceedings. 3 38 This failure could lead juvenile court judges to
conclude erroneously that the best way to protect the public is to revoke
the EJJ designation and impose the adult sentence at the first sign of
trouble. 339 While that may incapacitate the offender for a period of
time, when he is eventually released, he will probably be more of340a
threat to society than if he had stayed in the juvenile system.

Furthermore, juveniles will not change until they are ready. 341 Thus, a
332. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 321, at 252-54 (discussing the characteristics of juvenile
and adult correctional institutions).
333. Id. at 254-61.
334. See supra note 212 (juxtaposing the two possibilities).
335. HEIDE, supra note 126, at 237 (discussing young killers who are so "badly damaged that
rehabilitation appears... unlikely" and they are "likely to kill again").
336. See MYERS, note 126, at 192 (comparing systems designed to retain youths in juvenile
court and those that transfer youths to adult systems and concluding that systems which retain
youths appear best); see also Farrington & Loeber, supra note 317, at 227-29 (discussing the
three studies that suggest transfer to adult court increases recidivism rates).
337. See Spring, supra note 214, at 1382-83 (arguing that the juvenile court should have
discretion in determining whether to revoke EJJ status).
338. Interview with Cathryn Crawford, Clinical Professor, Nw. Sch. of Law, in Chi., Ill. (Dec.
21, 2006) [hereinafter Professor Crawford Interview].
339. See MYERS, supra note 172, at 105-11 (explaining why harsher punishments are not
effective deterrents and advocating a matching design fitting crime and punishment).
340. See Farrington & Loeber, supra note 317, at 227-29 (discussing the three studies that
suggest transfer to adult court increases recidivism rates).
341. JOAN SERRA HOFFMAN, YOUTH VIOLENCE, RESILIENCE, AND REHABILITATION 108
(2004) ("All the young people who participated in [the] study remarked that the . . . desire to
change has to come from within."). Hoffman describes change as a process containing various
phases. Id. at 112. The process begins with thinking about changing, proceeds to wanting to
change, followed by being ready for change, then beginning to change, and finally maintaining
that change. Id. After a young person is ready to change, he nonetheless needs external support
to continue the process. Id. at 114.
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juvenile's behavior at the beginning of his sentence is not indicative of
how he may act over time. 342 The failure to clarify when a judge must
revoke EJJ status to protect the public may lead judges to revoke EJJ
343
status hastily, unnecessarily interrupting the long process of change.
B. Problems in the EJJ Revocation Procedure
The EJJ statute contains a procedure for revoking a juvenile's EJJ
status and executing the adult sentence, but the revocation process is
unjust in some cases and uncertain in others. 344 Either a new offense or
a technical violation could trigger revocation. 34 5 For both situations,
the revocation procedure should be changed. 346 Currently, if the
juvenile commits a new offense, the imposition of the adult sentence is
mandatory, which could result in injustice and interrupt an otherwise
successful rehabilitation process. 347 Besides commission of a new
offense, the EJJ statute is so unclear about what other violations could
trigger the adult sentence that it fails to provide any meaningful
incentive for the juvenile to modify his behavior or any guidance to the
judge in executing the adult sentence. 34 8 This Part first discusses how
mandatory revocation for a new offense is counterproductive in some
cases. 34 9 Then this Part examines the uncertainties surrounding
revocation based on a technical violation and how those uncertainties
350
may lead to a constitutional challenge.

342. See HEIDE, supra note 126, at 87-219 (presenting case studies of juvenile killers
comparing pre-conviction interviews with interviews four to six years later, concluding that some
of the youth had matured and others had not).
343. Cf Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973) ("[T]he whole thrust of the probationparole movement is to keep men in the community, working with adjustment problems there, and
using revocation only as a last resort when treatment has failed or is about to fail.") (citation
omitted).
344. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6) (2006), amended by 2007 11. Legis. Serv. 95-331
(West).
345. Id.
346. See infra Part IV.B. l-B.2 (explaining why the procedures are insufficient).
347. See HOFFMAN, supra note 341 (describing the process of change).
348. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining the problem with the technical violations).
349. See infra Part IV.B.I (explaining that mandatory revocation for a new offense is bad
policy because not all offenses indicate that the juvenile is a danger to society).
350. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the many conditions that come with a juvenile sentence
and the confusion those conditions could cause).
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1. Problems with "New Offense"
There are several problems with the EJJ's statutory language of "new
offense." 35 1 First, the meaning of "new offense" is vague, leaving its
application far too broad. 3 52 Second, the statute wrongfully removes
the judge's discretion in considering revocation of EJJ status. 353 The
354
negative effects of this are illustrated through case studies.
Furthermore, eliminating discretion for new offenses forces the system
to exercise discretion in other, earlier parts of the process, which may
355
allow the juvenile to escape accountability entirely.
a. The Meaning of "New Offense" Is Unclear
Although the statute does not explicitly define "offense," parties have
consistently spoken of "offense" as involving a violation of the criminal
code, not merely a status offense. 35 6 This is consistent with the
legislative history in which speakers used "crime" and "offense"
interchangeably. 35 7 However, the statute does not specify what
"offense" means, so a judge may feel obligated to execute the adult
sentence after a curfew ordinance violation or after a juvenile runs away
358
from home.
Additionally, the statute does not distinguish among classes of
offenses; all new offenses must trigger the adult sentence, regardless of
severity. 35 9 As a result, an EJJ juvenile could have his adult sentence
351. See infra Parts IV.B.l.a-b (discussing problems with EJJ revocation upon a new
offense).
352. See infra Part IV.B. L.a (discussing possible meanings of "new offense").
353. See infra Part IV.B. lb-c (demonstrating problems with the judge's lack of discretion).
354. See infra Part IV.B. 1.c (examining case studies).
355. See infra Part IV.B.1.d (illustrating discretion in other parts of the system).
356. E.g., IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART Two, supra note 308, at 106-07 (listing
how various juvenile court professionals defined offense). A status offense is a "minor's
violation of the juvenile code by doing some act that would not be considered illegal if an adult
did it, but that indicates that the minor is beyond parental control. Examples include running
away from home, truancy, and incorrigibility." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1112 (8th ed.).
357. See 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATES 11 (111. May 5, 1998)
(saying courts would still have discretion under the statute for technical violations, but courts
would not have such discretion where the juvenile has been convicted of a later crime) (emphasis
added).
358. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6) (2006), amended by 2007 I11.
Legis. Serv. 95331 (West) ("When it appears that a minor convicted in an extended jurisdiction juvenile
prosecution ... has violated conditions of his or her sentence or is alleged to have commited a
new offense upon the filing of a petition ... the court may... issue a warrant for the arrest of the
minor... [and] order execution of the previously imposed adult criminal sentence.").
359. Id. ("[I]f the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that the minor committed a new
offense, the court shall order execution of the previously imposed adult criminal sentence.")
(emphasis added). In addition, Professor Crawford has argued that because of the serious
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259

triggered by a misdemeanor or other minor offense. 360 Such an offense
361
does not necessarily show that the minor is a danger to the public.
However, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of such a
362
violation, the judge has no choice but to impose the adult sentence.
b. EJJ Revocation Versus Probation Revocation

The

revocation

procedure

is

based

on juvenile

probation

procedures, 363 but the judge's lack of discretion goes against the theory
underlying probation revocation hearings. 364 At least in the adult
context, probation in Illinois is a privilege, used when a court
determines that a defendant would not pose a threat to society and that
probation would enhance the defendant's rehabilitation. 3 65 A violation
of probation suggests that the defendant is a threat to society and that
the reasons for keeping him out of jail are no longer valid. 36 6 In
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,3 67 the United States Supreme Court held that
revocation of adult probation should only be used as a last resort when
treatment has failed or is about to fail. 3 68 The Illinois Supreme Court

consequences, the prosecution should have to prove the new offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
not just by a preponderance of the evidence. Professor Crawford Interview, supra note 338. One
response to this argument is that the juvenile is not being sentenced for the new offense, but for
the original one, which could have originally resulted in the adult sentence. Interview with Dr.
David Olson, Criminal Justice Professor, Loyola Univ. Chi., in Chi., Ill. (Nov. 20, 2006).
360. For example, theft of less than $300 is a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/16-1(b)(1) (2006). Criminal damage to property resulting in damage under $300 is also a Class
A misdemeanor. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-1(2) (2006). Criminal trespass to property is a
Class B misdemeanor. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-3(a) (2006), amended by 2007 I11.Legis.
Serv. 95-331 (West). While these are all crimes, they are common youthful transgressions. But
for an EJJ juvenile, they will result in the execution of the adult sentence.
361. See Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 201, at 14 (discussing how juveniles
automatically transferred to adult court based on "victimless zone transfers" (drug and weapon
offenses around schools or public housing) are generally not viewed as a threat to public safety
and the resulting adult convictions are more harmful than helpful to society).
362. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6) (2006), amended by 2007 I11.Legis. Serv. 95-331
(West).
363. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715 (2006 & West Supp. 2007) (detailing the process
for probation).
364. See infra notes 365-372 and accompanying text (explaining why the EJJ revocation
procedure goes against the theory behind probation).
365. People v. Allegri, 487 N.E.2d 606, 607 (II1. 1985); see also People v. Cozad, 511 N.E.2d
211, 216 (II1. App. Ct. 1987) ("The two primary purposes of probation are (1) to rehabilitate the
defendant without sending him or her to prison, and (2) to protect the public from the type of
conduct that led to the placement of the defendant on probation.").
366. Allegri, 487 N.E.2d at 607.
367. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 779 (1973).
368. Id. at 785.
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adopted Gagnon in People v. Beard.369 Thus, a judge need not impose
a prison sentence on every proven violation of probation if he believes
that the probationer still has strong rehabilitative potential. 370 The
Illinois Supreme Court has not explicitly made such principles
applicable to juveniles, but juvenile probationers' interest in their
conditional liberty is similar to that of adult probationers, allowing them
371
many of the same procedural protections at revocation hearings.
Furthermore, these adult cases should apply to EJJ revocation hearings
37 2
because such hearings may result in an adult sentence.
Although probation and EJJ status are two distinct designations, they
are significantly similar. As such, EJJ revocation should follow a
procedure similar to one applied when probation is revoked. 373 A court
gives a probation sentence if it determines that the individual is not a
threat to society. 374 For that reason, before revoking probation, the
court must state the reasons why the individual now poses a threat to
society. 3 75 Similarly, an EJJ designation implicitly means that a
transfer to adult court is not appropriate and the juvenile could benefit
from the services of the juvenile court. 3 76 Therefore, an EJJ designation

369. People v. Beard, 319 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ill. 1974) (accepting the idea from Gagnon that a
probationer's liberty is not taken away unjustifiably and the State is not "unnecessarily
interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the
community").
370. Id.
371. People v. Peterson, 384 N.E.2d 348, 353 (Il. 1978) (holding that coerced confessions
cannot be used in probation revocation procedures for both adult and juvenile probationers).
372. See State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. 2003) (requiring Minnesota courts to use
adult probation revocation procedures instead of juvenile procedures when revoking an EJJ
designation because it contemplates the imposition of an adult sentence).
373.

See infra notes 374-377 and accompanying text (comparing EJJ proceedings with

probation proceedings).
374. Peterson,384 N.E.2d at 352.
375. Beard, 319 N.E.2d at 747.
376. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 233, at 1017 ("An EJJ youth [in Minnesota] is one
whom a judge or a prosecutor already has determined can remain in juvenile court consistently
with 'public safety."'). After In re Christopher K., 841 N.E.2d 945 (Il. 2005), prosecutors
started filing the EJJ petitions at the same time as the transfer petitions. Jeff Coen, Juvenile
Sentencing Law Could Seal a Fate, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 2005, available at www.kidsincourt.net

(discussing the impact of legislation allowing youths to receive both juvenile detention and an
adult prison sentence). Professor Crawford believes that is how the statute is supposed to workputting both options before the judge and letting him decide. Professor Crawford Interview,
supra note 338. Compare 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3) (2006), amended by 2007 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 95-331 (West) with 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(1) (2006), amended by 2007

I11.Legis. Serv. 95-331 (West) (the same juveniles who are eligible for transfer to adult court are
eligible for EJJ designation).
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should only be revoked if the juvenile could no longer benefit from
377
services in the juvenile system.
In addition, the mandatory provision directly opposes the juvenile
justice system's focus on individual deterrence. 37 8 Juvenile court
judges interact with youth every day and are familiar with
developmental issues particular to adolescence. 37 9 Those judges are in
the best position to decide whether a new offense is merely a minor
deviance in the path to becoming a law-abiding citizen or whether the
new offense demonstrates that the juvenile has truly wasted his "last
chance" in the juvenile system. 380 Most importantly, a juvenile may
commit a new offense while serving probation, yet still successfully
complete probation. 381 In a study on juvenile probation, roughly thirtyfive percent of the juvenile probationers studied had one or more arrests
for new offenses, only one-quarter of which were violent offenses. 3 82 A
relatively large proportion of those rearrested were discharged with a
status of "satisfactory termination," and only one-quarter had their
probation revoked. 383 Therefore, juvenile court judges do not view
every new offense as indicative that the services are not helping,
especially in light of the fact that many of the new offenses may have
been due to poverty or substance abuse. 3 84 Thus, the EJJ statute
unnecessarily removes some juveniles from the juvenile court
jurisdiction and interrupts
what may be an otherwise successful
38 5
treatment program.
c. Case Studies About EJJ Sentences
A 2002 report, sponsored by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information
Authority, contained a detailed case study about an EJJ prosecution that

377. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 233, at 1071 (recommending that the Minnesota
legislature change its EJJ revocation procedure from the adult probation procedures to one which
"require[s] judges to consider whether a youth's earlier offense and subsequent violations pose a
threat to 'public safety' warranting imprisonment using the same procedures and criteria
employed to certify youths for criminal prosecution").
378. See Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 201, at 12 ("The goal of juvenile court
remains one of individual deterrence .... ").
379. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 40, at 694.
380. See Spring, supra note 214, at 1382 (arguing that juvenile judges should be given
discretion to deal with EJJ juveniles who reoffend).
381. SHARYN B. ADAMS, DAVID E. OLSON & RICH ADKINS, Executive Summary, in RESULTS
FROM THE 2000 ILLINOIS JUVENILE PROBATION OUTCOME STUDY (2002).

382.
383.
384.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 27.
Id.

385. See supra note 341 (discussing the process of change).
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demonstrates the problems in the EJJ revocation process. 386 The minor
in the case study pled guilty in an EJJ proceeding to robbing a
3 87
convenience store with a pellet gun while four friends waited outside.

This offense was the minor's first involvement with the juvenile justice
system. 388

The attorneys, the judge, the probation officer, and the

juvenile's mother all believed that the root of the juvenile's recent
change was the death of his father a few months earlier. 389 After the
death of his father, the minor began to engage in impulsive, selfdestructive behavior, including cocaine use. 390 The juvenile was given
a two-year juvenile probation sentence with a five-year suspended adult
39 1
sentence.
The juvenile began his probation sentence on intensive probation and
was gradually placed on less restrictive probation because of his
compliance and good behavior. 392 However, the first day he was
permitted to go out with a friend unsupervised, he and the friend were
39 3
arrested for retail theft of a few CDs, a Class A misdemeanor.

Because intense supervision had been effective, if the juvenile had been
on juvenile probation the judge likely would have modified the
probation to return to more intensive supervision. 3 94 The judge stated

that for most minors, stealing a CD would not result in a probation
revocation. 395 However, because the juvenile had an EJJ sentence, the
judge had no choice but to execute the adult sentence once the

386. IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART Two, supra note 308, at 74-139.

387. Id. at 75-76. He also pled guilty to conspiracy to rob a convenience store. Id.
388. Id. at 83.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 94. Interestingly, both the prosecution and the defense admitted that the case
would not have been transferred to adult court because the offense was not that serious and it was
the juvenile's first offense. Id. at 88. Without EJJ, the juvenile would never have been exposed
to an adult sentence, but the defense attorney did not feel that he could successfully rebut the
presumption that it should be an EJJ prosecution because of the juvenile's age (sixteen years old)
and the offense. Id. So, the juvenile pled guilty, accepting the EJJ designation and the agreedupon sentence to avoid the chance of being sentenced to detention. Id. at 91.
392. Id. at 97-100. The intensive probation involved electronic monitoring and random onsite and telephone checks. Id. at 97. The juvenile could only leave his house to go to school,
counseling, and work. Id. The restrictions were gradually eased as the minor complied with the
terms of the intensive probation. Id. at 99. Under the less-intensive probation, the minor was
allowed to participate in structured activities without a parent if he received permission at least
twenty-four hours in advance. Id. at 99-100.
393. Id. at 76. Retail theft, less than $150 is a Class A misdemeanor with a maximum prison
sentence of one year. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16A-10(l) (2006).
394.

IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART Two, supra note 308, at 137.

395. Id. at 128.
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396
prosecution proved the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.
The minor began his adult sentence at a maximum security adult prison,
while the friend who was with him received relatively minor
397
sanctions.
Although the judge told the juvenile at sentencing that any new
offense would result in the imposition of the adult sentence, the juvenile
admitted that he did not quite understand the ramifications of his
behavior. 39 8 In his case, the adult sentence was not a deterrent to future
risky behavior because the juvenile simply did not consider the
possibility that his behavior would trigger the adult sentence. 399 The
judge stated that EJJ would only work for minors with a certain
"mindset," that is, those with the ability to avoid acting impulsively and
40 0
to think about potential consequences before acting.
The public defender, the probation officer, and the judge on the case
agreed that the possibility of an adult sentence would not effectively
deter minors from reoffending. 40 1 The public defender noted that often
minors reoffend because it takes time to resolve the issues that led to
their criminal behavior in the first place, not because they are destined
to be criminals. 40 2 The juvenile court judge originally believed that the
EJJ statute was an effective idea, but later changed his mind when he
realized that the threat of an adult sentence would not serve as a
deterrent to minors. 40 3 In his experience, minors often violate probation
because they are not mature enough to think through the consequences
of their behavior.40 4 In this case, the threat of an adult sentence hanging
over the minor's head did not prevent him from taking risks, but he was
40 5
generally complying with the terms of his probation.

396. Id. at 137-38.
397. Id. at 122, 131.
398. Id. at 107. The minor denied that he committed retail theft because the store security
apprehended him before he passed the checkout lanes and the security officers could not have
reasonably inferred that he intended to steal the CDs. Id. at 76.
399. Id. at 107.
400. IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART Two, supra note 308, at 129, 136. The
researcher surmised that the minor did not consider the EJJ sentence an absolute bar to risky
behavior. Id. at 130. Instead, the minor may have acted by thinking "what violations he could
potentially commit and still avoid having the adult sanctions imposed." Id.
401. Id.at 125, 129.
402. Id. at 126. In this case, the minor's delinquent behavior probably stemmed from drug use
and his father's death. Id at 83. These problems cannot be remedied in a short time.
403. Id. at 127.
404. Id. at 127-28.
405. IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART TWO, supra note 308, at 136.

264
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In the case study, the judge's lack of discretion in imposing the adult
sentence ultimately hurt the minor, and arguably society as well.40 6 The
initial juvenile probation sentence included paying restitution, attending
high school or a GED program, obtaining a full- or part-time job,
getting a driver's license, and attending various counseling and
treatment programs.40 7 The programs included grief counseling, anger
management training, drug and alcohol treatment, and other life skills
training. 40 8 The minor accomplished a great deal in the initial two
months of probation before he was rearrested. 40 9 He completed a drug
education program, started working towards his GED, and attended
Alcoholics Anonymous. 4 10 In contrast, once in prison, he did not
4 11
receive any services.
The minor was later transferred to a medium security prison to finish
his sentence. 4 12 He chose not to take part in the prison GED program
because the inmates often got into fights during the class, and he did not
want to risk getting into a fight and having his parole date extended.4 1 3
4 14
As a result, he lost any progress he had made while on probation.
His former probation officer visited him while in prison and noted that
the minor had changed.4 15 The minor had gone from a "kid" to a
"hardened adult inmate." 4 16 The EJJ statute in this case failed both the
minor and the public. 4 17 The minor did not receive the services that
may have helped him deal with the death of his father and his drug use,
which everyone acknowledged was at the root of his delinquent
behavior. 4 18 Instead, he will be released back into society as a
"hardened adult inmate" with a criminal record, making it harder for
him to get a job, but equipped with new knowledge of how to survive in
prison.

4 19

406. See id. at 98-99, 123-24 (stating that the minor did not receive the services that could
have helped him and, upon release, he will not have any job skills).
407. Id. at 97-98.
408. Id. at 98. The minor thought the large number of conditions placed too much
responsibility on him and, in essence, set him up for failure. Id.
409. Id. at 99.
410. IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART TWO, supra note 308, at 99.
411. Id. at 123-24.
412. Id. at 123.
413. Id. at 124.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART TWO, supra note 308, at 124.
417. See id. at 83 (describing how services could have helped the minor with the issues he was

encountering).
418. Id. at83.
419. Id. at 124.
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In contrast, in New York, where imposition of an adult sentence is
not mandatory upon a new offense, a fourteen-year-old girl received a
conditional adult sentence after slashing another girl's face in a fight
over a boy. 420 She served a year in detention, received a year of
counseling, and was on probation for five years. 42 1 Although she
missed a number of appointments and was caught smoking marijuana
several times, she successfully completed her probation without
committing any more violent crimes.4 22 Not only was she able to avoid
having a felony record, she was not a threat to the public and was able
to stay with the child to whom she had given birth while on
probation.4 23 If the judge had been forced to impose an adult sentence
after the marijuana violations, she would have had a felony record,
which would have excluded her from federal housing programs,
rendered her ineligible to vote, and prevented her from obtaining certain
city jobs. 4 24 Above all, her child would have started life without her
mother. 42 5 The judge in New York expected progress, not perfection,
and had the discretion to allow the juvenile to continue striving for
426
perfection.
d. Discretion in Other Parts of the System that May Compensate for the
Lack of Judicial Discretion
Because an Illinois judge has no discretion in deciding whether to
impose the adult sentence after a new offense, probation officers or
prosecutors may be reluctant to bring new offenses to the court's
4 27
attention because of the harsh consequences that would result.
Discretion, then, would be exercised at a different level in the system,
but at a level in which the juvenile would not be held accountable for
his actions. 4 2 8 Furthermore, if the judge does not know about the new
offense, he will not be able to modify the juvenile's sentence to better

420. CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 69-70.
421. ld. at 70-71.
422. Id. at 71.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 49.
425. Id. at 71.
426. Id. at 98.
427. Professor Crawford Interview, supra note 338; IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART
Two, supra note 308, at 112.
428. See Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 201, at 14-15 (encouraging putting
limits on the number of station adjustments juveniles can get before being referred to the court
system because allowing too many sends youth the message that "there are no consequences for
their anti-social conduct").
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address the changed circumstances. 42 9 The result would be the opposite
of what the legislature intended: juveniles will not see the direct
consequences of their actions, will not learn accountability, and will not
have access to services that may prevent them from reoffending in the
430

future.

A mandatory adult sentence only serves to show a juvenile that he
truly has "one last chance." 4 3 1 Yet juveniles, in general, do not evaluate
risk in the same manner as adults. 4 32 In fact, juveniles are treated
differently than adults in the legal system partly because they do not yet
have the experience, perspective, and judgment to think through all the
possible choices and to avoid the harmful ones. 433 Adolescence is a
probationary period of life in which adolescents learn to make
responsible choices in order to assume adult roles. 434 Studies show that
part of the process of adolescence is learning how to make good choices
through trial and error, including making some bad choices along the

way. 435 The mandatory nature of the execution of the adult sentence

429. Not all the circumstances surrounding a juvenile are known at the time of sentencing;
some may arise later. See ADAMS, OLSON & ADKINS, supra note 381, at Executive Summary
("For a relatively large proportion of probationers the extent and nature of the offender's
substance abuse problem was unknown to the probation officer. Further, even among those
identified as substance abusers at the point of probation intake, not all were ordered or referred to
treatment. Analysis of the data clearly reveals the potential impact treatment can have on
reoffending: those with substance abuse problems who did not complete treatment were much
more likely to get rearrested while on probation as those who completed treatment.").
430. One of the most important aspects of discipline is that juveniles have clear, firm, and
consistent discipline. HEIDE, supra note 126, at 234-35. Consistency is perhaps the most
important. Id. at 235. Research suggests that punishments that are certain but moderate are a
better specific deterrent than more severe punishments, such as incarceration. MYERS, supra note
126, at 55. This suggests that if an EJJ juvenile commits a subsequent offense, and the prosecutor
files a petition to revoke, the punishment will be certain, but too severe for effective deterrence.
If the prosecutor does not file a petition to revoke, then the juvenile will not receive any
punishment for the new offense, holding him unaccountable for criminal actions.
431. See C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 720-21 (2005) ("While blended
sentencing may recognize the role that immaturity plays in serious criminal behavior, it fails to
differentiate ultimate punishment .... [B]y postponing punishment until perhaps years after the
original wrongful act, the 'accountability' lesson is lost ....When the adult sentence is imposed
because of the juvenile's less serious misconduct or when rehabilitation efforts have failed, the
ability of the juvenile to associate his original acts with his punishments is particularly
doubtful.").
432. See infra notes 433-41 and accompanying text (describing the differences between
adolescents and adults).
433. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
434. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspectiveon Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 175, 181 (1997).
435. See F. PHILIP RICE, THE ADOLESCENT: DEVELOPMENT, RELATIONSHIPS, AND CULTURE
161 (9th ed. 1999) ("The breadth of experience plays an important role in the quality of decisions
that are made.").
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after a new offense, regardless of the type or severity of the new
offense, may even undermine a juvenile's potential to change because
he may perceive the sanction as unfair, especially if the new offense
was minor. 436 As a result, he may feel cheated, not helped, by the
system.

43 7

In addition, the mandatory imposition of the adult sentence
undermines the protection of the public. 438 In most cases the public is
better protected by keeping the juvenile out of the adult system and

continuing to provide services in the juvenile system because juveniles
exposed to the adult system are more likely to reoffend. 4 39 In the longterm, most juveniles have a better chance of being productive citizens if
4 40
they stay in the juvenile system instead of the adult system.
Therefore, because the judge has no discretion in determining whether
to impose the adult sentence if the juvenile commits a new crime, the
EJJ statute creates a system that ultimately leads to higher juvenile
44 1
reoffending rates, which endangers the public.
2. Technical Violations Are Undefined
The EJJ statute is not completely devoid of discretion. 4 42 If an EJJ
juvenile violates the terms of his juvenile sentence other than by
committing a new offense, the judge has discretion to continue the
juvenile on the same sentence, modify the terms of the juvenile
sentence, or impose the adult sentence. 4 43 However, the statute does

436. The minor in the case study, discussed supra notes 386-419 and accompanying text,
committed retail theft, a Class A misdemeanor which alone could result in no more than one year
of incarceration, but ended up beginning a five-year adult sentence. IMPLEMENTATION
EVALUATION: PART TwO, supra note 308, at 76, 137. Throughout the study, the minor continued
saying how unfair it was to sentence him to prison after committing retail theft. Id. at 129-30.
The study, however, did not emphasize that the five-year sentence was for the original armed
robbery, not the retail theft, and instead focused on how unfair the minor, his mother, and others
involved felt the sanction was for such a minor offense. Id. at 125.
437. See MYERS, supra note 126, at 56 (explaining that one factor affecting how juveniles
respond to punishment is "whether or not the sanctioning is perceived as being fair").
438. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 321 and accompanying text (discussing three major
findings from studies that suggest transfer to adult court increases recidivism rates).
439. Id.at 261.
440. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 434, at 179 (explaining how a criminal sentence may
negatively affect "the future educational, employment and social productivity of those youths
whose crimes are adolescent-limited behavior").
441. See supra Part IV.A. (discussing how protecting the public is best served by keeping as
many juveniles out of the adult system as possible).
442. See infra note 443 and accompanying text (giving examples of conditions a judge may
attach to a sentence).
443. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6) (2006), amended by 2007 II1. Legis. Serv. 95-331
(West). Juvenile sentences can come with many conditions attached, such as mandatory school,
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not specify which technical violations could result in the execution of
the adult sentence, nor does it specify what factors a judge should
consider when making that determination. 44 4 The judge only has the
purpose statement of Part 8 to guide him, namely, protection of the
public.4 45 A judge may have conflicting views on how best to protect
the public: either impose the adult sentence at the first sign of deviance
or retain the juvenile in the juvenile system for as long as possible to
give the juvenile more time to reform. 44 6 This Part first explains that an
EJJ juvenile will be most successful in avoiding the adult sentence if
there are clear rules and standards for him to follow. 4 47 Next, this Part
argues that, although juvenile court judges are well-equipped to exercise
discretion in this context, judges may be unsure what conditions can be
the basis of an EJJ revocation. 44 8 Finally, this Part suggests how the

statute may succumb to an as-applied44 9constitutional challenge for

vagueness because of these uncertainties.

a. Juveniles Need Clear Notice of Prohibited Conduct
The Illinois statute does not optimize an EJJ juvenile's likelihood of
avoiding the adult sentence. 4 50 Juveniles evaluate risk differently than
adults45 1 and set different priorities because they focus more on short-

drug treatment programs, or curfews. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715 (2006 & West Supp.
2007). A violation of one such condition is a "technical violation," or "technical."
444. See In re Christopher K. 1, 810 N.E.2d 145, 158-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (presenting
Christopher K.'s argument that the statute is vague because it does not give the juvenile clear
notice of prohibited conduct or guidelines to the judge in determining when to execute the adult
sentence).
445. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-801 (2006).
446. See People v. Morgan, 758 N.E.2d 813, 825 (Ill. 2001) (identifying the conflict between
rehabilitation and punishment in the juvenile system).
447. Amici Brief, supra note 299, at 15.
448. See id. at 19 ("Under the vague terms of the Illinois EJJ statute, a judge ... has no
standards by which to determine whether or not the triggering misconduct must be a violation of
the dispositional order.").
449. See State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 771-72 (Minn. 2003) (reversing an EJJ revocation
for technical violations because the minor did not have sufficient notice that his conduct could
result in the execution of the adult sentence).
450. Cf Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 201, at 13 (describing Minnesota's EJJ
program as providing a specialized probation program for the EJJ juveniles with more intense
supervision).
451. Scott & Grisso, supra note 434, at 160-61; see DiFonzo, supra note 47, at 30
("Divergences between the adult's and the child's life experience and temporal outlook affect the
number and level of hazards undertaken. Unrealistic optimism in balancing the likelihood of
success versus the prospects for failure characterizes adolescence because juveniles generally
have difficulty meshing a speculative future outcome into their strong presentist outlook. . ..
Risk-taking helps to shape teenage identity .... ").
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term than long-term benefits. 452 Juveniles are also more susceptible to

peer pressure; in fact, peer pressure is the real motivation for most
teenage crime.4 53 Adolescents are still developing the skills necessary
to resist temptation when surrounded by peers who wish to
misbehave. 4 54 Thus, due to a juvenile's different developmental stage,
he may be overwhelmed by the number of conditions, both formal and
informal, that come with a juvenile sentence and may be unable to
comply in the same manner as an adult, especially when around his
4 55
peers.
Additionally, juveniles tend to be less psychologically mature than
adults as measured by self-restraint, consideration of future
consequences, and self-reliance. 45 6 The United States Supreme Court
acknowledged such differences in Roper v. Simmons and noted that
juveniles tend to be more reckless than adults, resulting in "impetuous
and ill-considered actions and decisions." 457 For example, adolescents
who are still developing problem-solving skills may be capable of
considering a number of variables at the same time, but are not yet able
to prioritize them appropriately. 4 58 As a result, if a juvenile is given a
452. See CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 27-28, for a story about a fourteen-year-old delivery
boy who hit a sixty-five-year-old widow with a frying pan as she was getting his tip and stole her
purse. She called the police, and the juvenile was quickly apprehended because his employer had
his address on file. Id. at 28. The juvenile did not think beyond the money he saw in her wallet
to what would happen after he robbed the woman. Id.
453. Scott & Grisso, supra note 434, at 160-61 (commenting on specific decision-making
factors of adolescents); DiFonzo, supra note 47, at 31; see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 30 (1998) ("The immediate motive for [juvenile] criminal
involvement is group standing. The participant is showing off, living up to group expectations,
pressing to avoid being ridiculed.").
454. CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 21 ("The idea that one's perception of self-worth as a
teenager often does not come from within but from without, is an important observation on the
nature of adolescence .... Key to resisting peer pressure is the capacity to believe in one's self,
one's destiny.").
455. See infra Parts IV.B.2.a.i-ii (discussing probation and incarceration).
456. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on
JurisdictionalBoundary, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 67, at
397.
457. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (internal quotations omitted); see Amici
Brief, supra note 299, at 16-17 ("Evidence suggests that adolescents use information differently
from adults . . . they are less likely to behave consistently across different problem solving
situations especially when subject to stress or ambiguity, and they differ from adults in how they
value perceived consequences in the decision-making process.") (quoting Jill Ward, Deterrence's
Difficulty Magnified: The Importance of Adolescent Development in Assessing the Deterrence
Value of Transferring Juveniles to Adult Court, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 253, 270-71
(2003)).
458. RICE, supra note 435, at 140. Studies show that adolescents make risky decisions
because they "assign different desirability weights to the various possible outcomes of their
actions," not because of a lack of information about the risk. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
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than the judge or
long list of conditions, he may view them differently
459
probation officer and emphasize the wrong ones.
Juveniles are also at a stage of development in which their characters
are still in formation. 460 Therefore, a juvenile's behavior at the
beginning of probation may change as he matures. 46 1 Because change
is a process, the judge should not expect a juvenile to incorporate all the
changes immediately. 4 62 Instead, the judge must give the juvenile clear
and careful instructions about the conditions of his probation and take
the time to ensure that the juvenile understands. 463 Then, if the juvenile
violates one of the conditions, the judge should reemphasize what could
occur if the juvenile does not comply with the sentence. 4 64 In this
manner, a juvenile will begin to internalize appropriate standards of
behaviors and consequences for not following them. 4 65 If a judge

merely gives a juvenile a laundry list of probation
conditions to
466
accomplish, he is setting the juvenile up for failure.
Cauffman, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1763, 1772 (1995). For example, one study demonstrated that half of adolescents who drink
and drive are aware of the risks of drunk driving. Id. Another study showed that, although
adolescents are generally aware that condoms can prevent the spread of HIV infections, twothirds of sexually active adolescents between sixteen and nineteen years old had sex without a
condom. Id.
459. See RICE, supra note 435, at 140 ("[Y]oung adolescents [have] the capacity to consider
alternatives, but this new-found capacity is not completely under control... because they are...
not yet experienced."); CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 123 ("[Juvenile] Judge Corriero gives
defendants clear, firm, and reasonable statements about what is expected of them: going to school
every day, program participation, curfew, and so on. The importance of this is backed up by the
therapeutic jurisprudence model's application of research on the psychology of compliance. This
research suggests that judges must carefully and clearly instruct the defendant about the
conditions of release ... ").
460. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
461. See HEIDE, supra note 126, at Part 2 (conducting case studies of five youth in prison for
murder, and noting the difference a few years made for some of them, but not others); Bishop &
Frazier, supra note 321 at 264 ("[M]ost youths who engage in delinquency will desist by early
adulthood .... ).
462. See HOFFMAN supra note 341, at 112 (explaining the process of change in adolescents).
463. CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 123-24.
464. Id. at 124.
465. Id.
466. The minor at the center of the case study, supra notes 386-419 and accompanying text,
felt that the number of conditions attached to his probation set him up for failure.
IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: PART Two, supra note 308, at 98; see also Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 571-72 (2005) (internal quotations omitted) ("[T]he likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.") (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 837 (1988)); 90T GEN. ASSEMBLY, HOUSE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 19 (I11.Jan. 27,
1998) (statement of Rep. M. Davis) ("Do you know that kids don't know the ramifications of
their behavior from now until tomorrow, but you want them to think that they'd better do this as a
child because that'll happen to them when they become adults?").
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In order to assist a juvenile in successfully completing his juvenile
sentence, the statute or the court should prioritize the conditions that the
minor must follow. 46 7 This Part first examines the conditions
associated with probation sentences, and then with those associated with
incarceration. 4 68 This Part also examines possible ways a judge might
469
find a violation in both a probation and a prison sentence.
i. Possible Ways To Violate a ProbationSentence
One of the key architects of the EJJ provision designed it with an
initial sentence of juvenile probation in mind. 4 70 A judge may impose a
number of conditions on a juvenile as part of probation, such as
mandatory school, drug treatment, anger management, or community
service. 4 7 1 Without proper guidance, the juvenile may have a different
idea than the judge or probation officer about which of these conditions
47 2
is the most important.
In addition to the conditions the judge attaches to probation, the
probation officer has the authority to modify the conditions of
probation, yet case law is unclear about how the modified conditions
factor into revocation. 473 The EJJ statute does not state whether a
violation of these later-imposed conditions could trigger the adult
sentence.474 The juvenile probation procedures do not clarify the issue,
and case law is conflicting and does not address conditions added by

467. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, FEDERAL PAROLE PRACTICES: BETTER
MANAGEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ARE NEEDED 177 (July 16, 1982) [hereinafter
FEDERAL PAROLE PRACTICES] ("Parole supervision is most effective when probation officers and
parolees have a clear understanding of what is required of them ...").
468. See infra Parts IV.B.2.a.i & ii (discussing probation sentences, then prison sentences,
respectively).
469. See id. (discussing ways juveniles might violate their sentences).
470. Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 201, at 13. In fact, probation is the most
common juvenile sentence for those found delinquent. ADAMS, OLSON, & ADKINS, supra note
381, at 1. At the end of 2000, there were ten times more juveniles on probation than in prison
(18,800 juveniles on probation compared to 1886 juveniles in prison). Id. However, no data is
available on the most common EJJ sentence.
471. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715 (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
472. See FEDERAL PAROLE PRACTICES, supra note 467, at 143 ("Two ingredients are
necessary for properly administering special conditions of parole: (1) clear definitions of
requirements and (2) specific criteria for determining what constitutes a violation of such
conditions.").
473. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715(6).
474. See id. (discussing violations of sentence conditions without specifying where those
conditions are found). In State v. B. Y.,B.Y.'s EJJ designation was initially revoked based on a
curfew his probation officer imposed, not the court. State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 771 (Minn.
2003).
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probation officers. 4 75 In In re Serna,4 7 6 the appellate court overturned a
juvenile's probation revocation for not attending school because
attending school was never a condition of probation. The judge told
him only to listen to his mother and stay out of trouble. 4 77 These
conditions were so vague that they violated the juvenile's due process
right to know the expected standards of behavior. 478 However, this
holding does not extend so far as to require written notice of the
probation conditions. 4 79 In a subsequent case, In re R.E.M., Jr., the
appellate court upheld the revocation of probation for violating an oral
condition, even though R.E.M., Jr. never received a written list 48of1
probation conditions. 480 The court deemed the oral notice sufficient.
Thus, mere notice of a condition may suffice as a basis to revoke
probation upon a violation of that condition, and 4it82may not matter
whether the probation officer or the judge imposed it.
In contrast to the juvenile revocation procedure, the adult probation
revocation procedure provides better guidance through case law. 48 3 By
statute, some conditions of adult probation are mandatory and others are
discretionary. 4 84 The mandatory conditions do not need to be in writing
to form the basis of a probation revocation, provided that the defendant
had knowledge of the conditions. 485 But the discretionary conditions
must be written on the certificate; it is not sufficient for the court to
advise the defendant orally of a discretionary condition. 4 86 If this
applies to juveniles, all probation conditions must be in writing because
are discretionary, according to the
all of the probation conditions
4 87
juvenile probation statute.
475. See infra notes 476-491 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainties in the
juvenile probation law).
476. In re Serna, 385 N.E.2d 87, 88-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
477. Id.
478. Id. at 89.
479. See In re R.E.M., Jr., 514 N.E.2d 593, 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (upholding the revocation
of juvenile probation for violating a condition that was not in writing when the juvenile was
aware of the condition).
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. See infra notes 484-486 and accompanying text (discussing caselaw about adult
probation).
484. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-6-3 (2006 & West Supp. 2007). In juvenile probation, all the
conditions are discretionary. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715 (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
485. People v. Glover, 489 N.E.2d 491, 494 (I11.App. Ct. 1986). In this case, the defendant
committed another offense during his probation. Id. at 492.
486. People v. Brown, 484 N.E.2d 945, 946-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
487. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715.
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The EJJ statute and case law, on the other hand, are silent as to
whether violations of conditions later added by the probation officer can
trigger the adult sentence. 4 88 Based on juvenile probation procedures,
nothing prevents those later conditions from forming the basis of a
revocation, resulting in the execution of an adult sentence. 4 89 However,
according to the adult procedure, they could not.490 At any rate, the
juvenile might place less importance on conditions added by his

probation officer
and not realize that violating them may trigger the
49 1
adult sentence.

ii. Possible Ways a Juvenile May Violate a Prison Sentence
If a juvenile is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the JDOC,
other problems arise regarding which violations can trigger the adult
sentence. 49 2 A juvenile prison sentence does not come with the same
conditions that probation does; in fact, the statute does not mention any
conditions of incarceration. 49 3 Instead, the juvenile is expected to
follow the rules and regulations of the institution, which means possible
infractions include not returning a library book on time or possessing a
cassette tape without permission. 4 94 Thus, a juvenile's success in an
institution often depends upon whether he has a good relationship with
the staff.4 95 Furthermore, it is not unusual for a juvenile to accumulate
many rule violations in the beginning of his confinement because other
inmates or staff may be testing him.4 96 Prison fights are common and

488. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6) (2006), amended by 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 95331 (West) (saying nothing about subsequent conditions imposed outside the court).
489. See supra Part IV.B (noting that it does not take much to revoke a juvenile's probation).
490. See Brown, 484 N.E.2d at 946-47 (requiring that any discretionary violation be written
on the probation certificate before it can be the basis of a revocation).
491. See State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 770 (Minn. 2003) ("[I]t is probable that [B.Y.] did
not fully comprehend the harsh sanction he would face for violating curfew.").
492. See infra notes 493-502 and accompanying text (discussing other problems that may
arise in the prison context). Illinois recently created the Department of Juvenile Justice, a
separate department in corrections to handle juvenile prisoners. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-2.5-5
(2006). Formerly, juveniles fell under the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, which
shared administration with the adult system. Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, Gov.
Blagojevich names acting director of new Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice,
http://www.idjj.state.il.us/subsections/news/default.shtml#2006May26.
493. Compare 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(l)(b) (2006 & West Supp. 2007)
(commitment to JDOC) with 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715 (2006 & West Supp. 2007)
(possible probation conditions) (showing commitment to JDOC does not include any affirmative
conditions like the probation statute does).
494. Amici Brief, supra note 299, at 10; Christopher K.'s Brief, supra note 294, at 41.
495. Professor Crawford Interview, supra note 338.
496. People v. Martin, 674 N.E.2d 90, 95 (I11.App. Ct. 1996). The unpublished testimony
regarding services in juvenile facilities was eliminated from opinion pursuant to Illinois Supreme
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sometimes unavoidable. 497 Therefore, the institutional setting is not the
498
best place to evaluate whether a juvenile will be a threat to society.
Professor Cathryn Crawford, the lead attorney on Christopher K.'s
appeal, believes that nothing short of an escape could trigger the adult

sentence.499 If that is true, then the entire point of the EJJ statute is
thwarted because an incarcerated EJJ juvenile could serve his sentence
and be released at age twenty-one without taking advantage of any of

the services in the juvenile system. 50 0 Christopher K.'s situation
50 1
demonstrates the effect this uncertainty can have on a juvenile.
When he was twenty years old, less than a year from successfully
completing his juvenile sentence, he was so paranoid about getting in
trouble in prison that he refused to even play basketball.50 2
b. Insufficient Judicial Guidelines for Technical Violations
The judge has little to guide him in deciding whether to impose the
adult sentence if any of these technical violations occur. 50 3 Different
judges might have different understandings of what constitutes a
violation that could trigger the adult sentence, or different probation
officers might report violations inconsistently based on personal
opinions of what is a serious violation. 50 4 Because of this uncertainty,
Court Rule 23. The full "hybrid" opinion is filed with the clerk, People v. Martin, No. 1-943937 (Il. App. Ct. Nov. 27, 1996).
497. See MARK SALZMAN, TRUE NOTEBOOKS 72-73 (2003) (describing racially motivated
fights in a juvenile hall in Los Angeles). A fight could even be considered a battery, a new
offense, resulting in a mandatory imposition of the adult sentence. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3
(2006).
498. Martin, 674 N.E.2d at 95.
499. Professor Crawford Interview, supra note 338.
500. The point behind the EJJ statute is to use the threat of the adult sentence as an incentive
for the juvenile to take advantage of the services, in part to help the juvenile build competencies
for the future. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 35 (Ill. Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Hawkinson).
501. See infra note 502, and accompanying text (explaining how the uncertainty affected
Christopher K.)
502. Jessica M. Bloustein, Two Sentences, One Future: Treatment of Serious Juvenile
Offenders Under Constitutional Challenge,MEDILL NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 23, 2005.
503. He only has the purpose statement in Part 8, that the most important purpose of an EJJ
proceeding is the community's right to be protected, and philosophy of BARJ, balancing the
needs of the victim, the community, and the offender. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101 (2006);
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1) (2006 & West Supp. 2007).
504. See FEDERAL PAROLE PRACTICES, supra note 467, at 147-48, 153 (finding that a lack of
guidance as to what constituted a violation of a special condition of parole led to federal
probation officers reporting violations inconsistently and addressing the "need for a specific
definition of when technical violations constitute sufficient infractions of the conditions of release
to justify a warrant request"); see also Paul H. Robinson, FairNotice and FairAdjudication: Two
Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 366 (2005) ("Reducing individual discretion is useful
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judges need standards to guide them in deciding when to impose the
adult sentence. 50 5
Discretion is important in an individualized,
50
rehabilitative setting, 6 but a lack of standards leaves judges uncertain
about what they are allowed to do, defense lawyers uncertain about how
best to prepare for the hearing, and appellate courts uncertain about
what to examine on review. 50 7 Thus, the judge must speculate about the
policy behind the EJJ revocation provision 50 8 and guess how to balance
the conflicting punitive and rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
system. 50 9 In every other part of the 1998 Act where the judge
exercises discretion over whether a minor should be transferred to the
adult system, the legislature provided guidelines for the judge to
consider.5 10 On review, appellate courts look to whether the judge used
those standards in her decision-making. 5 11 The silence here leaves
because with discretion inevitably comes disparity based upon the inherent differences among
decision makers ....
Room for the exercise of discretion also can give opportunity to malevolent
influences such as racism, sexism, and the like.").
505. See Tim Searchinger, Note, The Procedural Due Process Approach to Administrative
Discretion: The Courts' Inverted Analysis, 95 YALE L.J. 1017, 1027-28 (1986) (stating that
substantive standards reduce the threat of arbitrariness and discrimination in adjudication, while
"a lack of standards makes decisions 'responsive to whim or discrimination unrelated to any
specific determination of need by the responsible policy-making organs of society"') (quoting
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 90
(1960)); se, also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A3(a) Guidelines versus
Policy Stints. (2006) (choosing to issue advisory policy statements instead of guidelines for
revocation of probation because it provided greater flexibility to the courts). But see Klein, supra
note 45, at 388 (claiming that a long list of factors in discretionary decisions "reinforce judges'
exercise of virtually unreviewable discretion by allowing them to emphasize one set of factors or
another to justify whatever disposition they may prefer") (citing Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile
Court Meets the Principleof the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471,491 (1987)).
506. Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure to
Recognize the Reshaping of JudicialDiscretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 49495 (1999).
507. Id. at 501 (discussing the confusion resulting when, in the absence of "any other law,"
courts have no "official standards to apply").
508. See id. at 496 (discussing how procedural rules "cannot resolve the continuing policy
debate over the proper goals of criminal sentencing").
509. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(1) (2006) (stating that the purpose of the Article on
Delinquent Minors is to protect the citizens, hold juveniles accountable, rehabilitate the offender,
and provide due process); Geraghty & Rhee, supra note 129, at 631 ("Because most transfer
statutes fail to give any guidance on how to resolve a conflict between punitive and rehabilitative
factors, even though such conflicts occur frequently, the judge often must exercise unfettered
discretion.").
510. See supra Part II.C (explaining discretionary transfers).
511. E.g., People v. Clark, 518 N.E.2d 138, 146 (I11.1987), cert. denied, 97 U.S. 1026 (1990)
("[Prior cases] require that the juvenile judge receive sufficient evidence on all statutory factors..
. Where the record fails to support the juvenile judge's recitation that all statutory factors were
considered, there is an abuse of discretion."); People v. M.D., 461 N.E.2d 367, 372-73 (I11.App.
Ct. 1984) ("[W]hile no formal statement of reasons or conventional findings of fact are necessary
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judges to decide whether the guiding policy is to truly give juveniles

"one last chance" and tolerate very little deviance from the probation
conditions, or to examine whether the violations show that a juvenile is
no longer amenable to the services in the juvenile system. 5 12 This,
5 13
however, leaves policy decisions in the hands of judges.
c. Possible Legal Challenges After Revocation for a Technical
Violation

These uncertainties could result in a constitutional challenge if a
5 14
juvenile's adult sentence is executed because of a technical violation.
A challenge may be successful if the juvenile did not have notice that
his behavior could trigger the adult sentence or the judge acted
arbitrarily. 5 15 It is an element of due process that a criminal statute be
clearly defined. 5 16 A person cannot be held responsible for violating a
statute unless he reasonably could be expected to know, in light of the
particular facts of his case, that his conduct was proscribed.5 17 Due
process also requires that a statute provide law enforcement personnel
and triers of fact with sufficient guidelines to avoid arbitrary

enforcement and to prevent them from basing enforcement on their own
personal convictions. 518
The uncertainties surrounding when a
technical violation could trigger the adult sentence could lead to a
5 19
constitutional violation.

[in a transfer hearing], the juvenile judge must take care to preserve a record sufficiently explicit
so that his exercise of discretion may be reviewed meaningfully.") (quoting People v. Taylor, 391
N.E.2d 366 (I11.
1979)).
512. See Girl's Trial Opens, supra note 13, at 1 ("[B]ecause the [EJJ] measure has never been
used in Cook County ... it is unclear what kind of offense would be serious enough to invoke
[the juvenile's] adult murder sentence.").
513. Leaving policy decisions in the hands of judges could be a problem because judges are
part of the judicial branch, not the policy-making legislative branch. See Decker, supra note 309,
at 246 ("A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.").
514. Cf O'Hara Kelly, supra note 310, at 847 ("Probation conditions may be voided if they
are impossible to follow, excessive, vague, or illegal.").
515. An "as-applied" constitutional challenge looks to the particular facts of the case to see
whether a reasonable person would understand that his conduct was prohibited. Decker, supra
note 309, at 281; see In re Serna, 385 N.E.2d 87, 89 (I11.
App. Ct. 1978) (overturning a juvenile's
probation revocation for unconstitutional vagueness because the judge never set any specific
conditions of probation).
516. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
517. People v. Garrison, 412 N.E.2d 483, 488-89 (Il1. 1980).
518. Id. at 488.
519. E.g., State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2003), discussed infra notes 521-529 and
accompanying text (showing how the EJJ revocation process can be overturned).
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A challenge to the EJJ revocation process was successful 5in
20
Minnesota, whose EJJ statute was the model for the Illinois statute.
In State v. B. Y., the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the revocation
of B.Y.'s EJJ status based on a curfew violation. 5 2 1 The probation
officer, not the court, imposed the curfew because B.Y. had failed to
comply with the probation conditions. 5 22 The Minnesota statute
requires a judge to consider any mitigating factors before imposing the
adult sentence. 523 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the trial
court overlooked potential mitigating factors, including that B.Y.
probably did not fully understand the harsh consequence that could
result from violating the curfew. 524 In addition, a curfew violation did
not show that B.Y. was no longer amenable to treatment; thus, revoking
5 25
EJJ status may have been premature.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that in an EJJ
revocation proceeding, a court must follow adult probation procedures,
specifically the three factors established in an earlier Minnesota case,
State v. Austin.52 6 Before a court in Minnesota may revoke an EJJ

designation, it must (1) specify which condition or conditions were
violated; (2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and
(3) find that the violations demonstrate that probation is no longer
appropriate and incarceration is necessary instead. 5 27 The court stressed
that the revocation of an EJJ designation should be done only if the

520. See Q&A on Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 201, at 13 (showing that Minnesota was
the original EJJ state).
521. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 766. The Minnesota statute provides that, for a certain class of EJJ
juveniles, if the court finds that the defendant violated a condition of his sentence, either by
committing a new offense or violating a condition of his disposition, the court must order the
execution of the adult sentence unless the court makes written findings of mitigating factors.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130 Subd. 5 (West 2007).
522. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 770.
523. Id. at 772. The Minnesota EJJ statute differs from the Illinois statute in that revocation is
never mandatory. MINN. JUV. DELINQ. PROC. R. 19.11, subd. 3(C). In most cases, the court has
discretion after finding a violation. Id. at 19.11, subd. 3(C)(1). However, if the juvenile was
originally convicted of an offense with a presumptive prison sentence, the court must execute the
adult sentence unless it finds mitigating factors. Id. at 19.11, subd. 3(C)(3). Thus, a court always
has an option to continue the juvenile sentence if the circumstances do not warrant the adult
sentence. Santelmann & Rafferty, supra note 214, at 444.
524. B. Y., 659 N.W.2d at 770.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 768-69. The Austin factors were from an earlier Minnesota case, State v. Austin,
295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980). The Austin factors are not applicable to juveniles in general. In
re AW.S., No. A05-1215, 2006 WL 1529352, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2006). The
Minnesota Supreme Court applied them to the EJJ revocation procedure because of the serious
consequences that may result from revocation. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769.
527. B. Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768.
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violation demonstrated that the juvenile would probably continue

antisocial behavior. 528 A judge should not revoke an EJJ designation
5 29

merely on the basis of an accumulation of technical violations.
The Minnesota Supreme Court remedied the potential problems in
Minnesota's EJJ statute by defining when the court should revoke EJJ
designation because of technical violations and execute the adult
sentence. 5 30 The Illinois statute, similar to the Minnesota statute, could
face a similar challenge because it also fails to set forth any criteria for1
53
the judge to use when deciding whether to impose the adult sentence.
In Minnesota, the statute directs the judge to consider mitigating factors;

thus, the court in B.Y remedied the problem through statutory
interpretation. 532 However, Illinois does not require a judge to consider
mitigating factors, nor does it have the equivalent of Minnesota's Austin
factors to guide juvenile court judges in the revocation procedure. 533 In
the adult context, Illinois does require that revocation of probation be a
last resort, to be used only when treatment is about to fail.5 34 However,
in Illinois, a probation violation need not be intentional if the violation

shows that the probationer is a danger to society; nothing prevents a
judge from revoking based on an accidental violation. 5 35
The
Minnesota example demonstrates an instance in which the Illinois
statute could be vulnerable to an as-applied constitutional challenge if
the juvenile did not have notice that his behavior could trigger the adult
5 36
sentence.

528. Id. at 772.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(6) (2006), amended by 2007 I1. Legis. Serv. 95331 (West) (detailing the current EJJ revocation hearing procedures).
532, See MINN. Juv. DELINQ. PROC. R. 19.11, subd. 3(A) ("If the court finds ... that any
provisions of the disposition order were violated ... the court may revoke the probationer's
extended jurisdiction juvenile status .... ") (emphasis added); MINN. Juv. DELINQ. PROC. R.
19.11, subd. 3(C) ("If the extended juvenile jurisdiction conviction was for an offense with a
presumptive prison sentence ... the court shall order execution of the sentence unless the court
makes written findings indicating the mitigating factors that justify continuing the stay.")
(emphasis added).
533. The closest case that exists is People v. Beard, 319 N.E.2d 745 (Ill. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975), in which the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the policies set forth in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), and required a showing that probation was no longer
appropriate for the probationer before revoking his probation.
534. Beard, 319 N.E.2d at 748.
535. People v. Alegri, 487 N.E.2d 606, 608 (Il. 1985).
536. See supra notes 520-529 and accompanying text (discussing the possible constitutional
challenge).
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V. PROPOSAL

Although the intent behind the EJJ statute was to use the threat of the
adult sentence as a deterrent to the EJJ juvenile to avoid reoffending,
studies demonstrate that, in reality, the threat will not be a consistent
deterrent. 5 37 The EJJ statute does, however, allow a juvenile court
judge to take a chance on some juveniles whom he would otherwise
transfer to criminal court and allow them more time in the juvenile
system. 538 The adult sentence should be a last resort, not a first resort,
539
reserved for cases in which a juvenile sentence is not effective.
540
Some juveniles will change their behavior, but only with time.
Although there may be a few juvenile offenders who are such a threat to
society that they should never be released, those juveniles cannot be
identified through early assessment. 54 1 Trying to identify them early
will result in false positives, incarcerating too many juveniles
unnecessarily. 542 The EJJ statute will be most effective if it keeps as
many juveniles in the juvenile system as possible. 54 3 Sending a juvenile
to the adult system will likely increase the chances that he will
reoffend. 544 Therefore, the revocation process should be designed to
give the juvenile many opportunities to comply with the juvenile
545
sentence.
This Part proposes a process, working within the current statute, that
a judge should follow for technical violations in which the judge
imposes increasingly harsh juvenile sanctions on the offender before
resorting to the adult sentence. 546 This Part then suggests that the
legislature should amend the EJJ statute to make revocation after a new
537. See supra Part IV.A (discussing how juveniles do not think about future consequences
the same way adults do).
538. 90TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, SENATE TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 33 (I11.Jan. 29, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Hawkinson).
539. Id.
540. See supra note 341 (discussing the process of change).
541. HEIDE, supra note 126, at 237.
542. Id.
543. See supra Part IV.A (demonstrating that the adult system harms juveniles and increases
the chance they will reoffend).
544. See supra note 3241 (discussing studies that suggest transfer to adult court increases
recidivism rates).
545. Cf Arkansas' EJJ provision, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-507(e)(1) (West 2007) (requiring
a court to review the juvenile's status before juvenile jurisdiction ends). If the juvenile is
approaching his twenty-first birthday (or eighteenth in some cases), and has not yet had a hearing
about his status, the court will conduct a hearing to determine whether to release the juvenile or
execute the adult sentence based on how the juvenile has responded to treatment.
546. See infra Part V.A (laying out a process for revoking based on technical violations that
will ensure that the juvenile has notice and the judge acts consistently).
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offense discretionary. 547 In the alternative, the legislature should amend
the statute so that only violent offenses trigger mandatory revocation;
the judge should have discretion for non-violent offenses. 548 The adult
sentence should be a last resort for those juveniles who consistently
put
5 49
the public at risk, not a first resort for minor infractions.
A. Suggested Processfor Revocation Based on the CurrentEJJ Statute
After an EJJ juvenile receives a probation sentence, the court should
550
leave it to the probation officer to set particular goals for the juvenile.
If a juvenile consistently disobeys a probation order, such as violating
55 1
curfew, then the juvenile should be brought back before the judge.
The judge should specifically include that particular condition in the
probation order, but not execute the adult sentence at that time. 5 52 If the
juvenile continues to violate that specific condition, the judge should
exercise other options at his disposal, such as more intensive probation,
a stay in the temporary detention center, or even commitment to
JDOC. 553 When the juvenile completes that sanction, the judge should
give the juvenile another chance to comply with the condition before
executing the adult sentence. 554 If the juvenile obeys that particular
condition after seeing the judge, but begins to violate another condition,

547. See infra notes 568-569 and accompanying text (suggesting that the legislature should
made all revocations discretionary).
548. See infra notes 569-573 and accompanying text (suggesting at least the legislature
should make revocation for non-violent offenses discretionary).
549. See Clarke, supra note 431, at 683 ("The 'blended sentencing' option was seen as a way
to keep the focus on the rehabilitation of youthful offenders while still providing some measure of
accountability and public safety: the law retained the threat of the adult sentence should
rehabilitation efforts fail.").
550. The probation officer will have the most contact with the juvenile, and thus is in the best
position to adapt the goals if necessary. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-715(6) (2006 & West
Supp. 2007) (allowing the probation officer to adjust the conditions of probation according to a
system established by the chief judge of the circuit).
551. See CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 124 ("[W]hen a defendant is not meeting Judge
Corriero's expectations, he reemphasizes the consequences of not doing so. An important part of
the defendants' socialization involves their internalizing what is at stake if they don't follow the
judge's rules.").
552. By including the particular condition in the probation order, everyone can set the same
priorities regarding the conditions. See supra notes 450-466 and accompanying text (discussing
how young people view choices differently because their problem-solving skills are not as
developed as adults).
553. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710 (2006 & West Supp. 2007) (listing juvenile
sentencing options).
554. Perhaps the juvenile has learned his lesson at this point, but unless he is twenty years and
364 days, there is still time. See supra note 341 (discussing how change is a process).
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the judge should repeat the process for the new condition. 55 5 Therefore,
the juvenile will see the consequences of his actions, but will still have
time to take advantage of the juvenile system. 556 Moreover, this
procedure will ensure that the juvenile has notice that his conduct could
557
trigger the adult sentence.
If an EJJ juvenile is sentenced to prison, the judge should follow the
same procedure laid out above for any rule violations. 5 58 If the
juvenile, however, is written up for fighting, and that is treated as a new
offense, the juvenile should have the ability to argue self-defense to
avoid the automatic execution of the adult sentence. 559 Furthermore,
the judge should impose affirmative conditions on the juvenile if he is
incarcerated, such as mandatory school or skills training. 5 60 This will
ensure that the juvenile will be more prepared upon release to lead a
56 1
productive life.
When a judge does decide to revoke an EJJ designation and execute
the adult sentence, he should follow the adult probation revocation
procedure, which requires revocation to be a last resort. 562 The judge
should make written findings about what has changed that makes the
adult sentence appropriate when it was not at the time of the EJJ
designation. 56 3 Finally, the judge should consider factors similar to
those found in Arkansas' EJJ statute, which focus on how the juvenile
555. See Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing
Intervention, Prevention, andAdjudication, 37 FAM. L. Q. 381, 382 (2003) ("[The Juvenile Court
founders] envisioned the Juvenile Court functioning in the best interest of children and youth,
acting in any circumstance, they said, exactly as a kind and just parent would act.").
556. Such a process has been successful in New York's Youthful Offender paradigm.
CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 11-13, 53-55.
557. See supra notes 520-529 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Supreme
Court's reluctance to revoke EJJ status if the juvenile might not have had notice that a certain
violation could trigger the adult sentence).
558. See supra notes 550-556 and accompanying text (suggesting a procedure for technical
violations which provides the juvenile with plenty of notice).
and Constitutional Liberty: An
559. See generally James E. Robertson, "Fight or F.
Inmate's Right to Self-Defense When Targeted by Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REV. 339 (1995)
(discussing the dangers inmates face in prison from other inmates).
560. See Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, supra note 492 ("By creating a separate
Department of Juvenile Justice, young offenders will receive individualized services including
educational, vocational, social, emotional services that will help enable them to become
productive adults.").
561. See id. ("It's expected that the new department [of Juvenile Justice] will help reduce the
number of juvenile offenders that return to the juvenile system.").
562. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).
563. See Daniel F. Pair, A Uniform Code of Procedurefor Revoking Probation, 31 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 117, 173 (2003) (recommending that for every probation revocation, "the court shall
issue a written statement, or shall cause a stenographic transcript to be made, of the reasons for
revoking probation and the evidence relied upon for the revocation").

282

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 39

responded to services, the seriousness of the original offense, and the
5 64
recommendations of those who worked with the juvenile.
B. Suggested Legislative Changes to the EJJStatute
Under the current EJJ revocation procedure, a judge cannot ignore
the statutory language and refuse to execute the adult sentence after the
juvenile commits a new offense. 565 Therefore, the probation officers
and the state's attorneys will have to exercise discretion to prevent
injustice in specific cases. 56 6 For example, a state's attorney need not
file a petition to revoke for minor offenses, like vandalism or possession
567
of marijuana, for which an adult sentence would be unjust.

Ideally, the legislature should amend the EJJ revocation procedure to
make all revocations discretionary. 568 In that case, the judge should use
the same reasoning set forth above for deciding whether to revoke based
on a technical violation: revocation should be a last resort and the judge

564. The factors are:
(A) The experience and character of the juvenile before and after the juvenile
disposition, including compliance with the court's orders;
(B) The nature of the offense or offenses and the manner in which the offense or
offenses were committed;
(C) The recommendations of the professionals who have worked with the juvenile;
(D) The protection of public safety;
(E) Opportunities provided to the juvenile for rehabilitation and the juvenile's efforts
toward rehabilitation; and
(F) Victim impact evidence...
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-507(e)(2) (West 2007). New York has developed similar factors
through case law to identify which juvenile should take part in the Youthful Offender Program.
CORRIERO, supra note 216, at 85. A court must consider:
[T]he gravity of the crime and manner in which it was committed, mitigating
circumstances, defendant's prior criminal record, prior acts of violence,
recommendations in pre-sentence reports, defendant's reputation, the level of
cooperation with authorities, defendant's attitude towards society and respect for the
law, and the prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive life.
Id.
565. See Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretionin the Distributionof CriminalSanctions,
25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 394 (1988) (discussing how prior and precise written rules can be
harmful when they leave decisionmakers unable to adapt to individual circumstances).
566. See id. at 459 ("[T]he virtues of the legality principle apply to all stages in the process of
distributing criminal sanctions. At the same time, normative judgments, which necessarily
depend on vague standards, must be made part of the process.").
567. Cf Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 233, at 1017 (describing that one concern with the
Minnesota EJJ procedure is that "even if an initial offense clearly would not warrant certification
and a subsequent offense or probation violation would not in itself justify imprisonment, for an
EJJ youth, the two in combination may result in a more severe outcome than either a juvenile or
criminal court judge would impose if asked directly whether imprisonment is appropriate").
568. Professor Crawford Interview, supra note 338.
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should use the Arkansas factors to determine whether revocation is
56 9
appropriate.
If, however, the legislature chooses not to give the juvenile court
judges that much discretion, the statute should at least differentiate
between violent and non-violent offenses. 570 Only a violent offense
should be the basis for the mandatory execution of the adult sentence,
and juvenile court judges should have discretion in deciding whether to
execute the adult sentence for a non-violent offense. 57 1 Otherwise, the
EJJ statute could widen the net and send more juveniles to the adult
system unnecessarily. 5 72 A judge should execute the adult sentence
based on a non-violent offense only after considering the Arkansas
factors, focusing particularly on how the juvenile has responded to
57 3
services.
VI. CONCLUSION

For too long, juvenile justice policy has been driven by a perceived
demand to "get tough" on juvenile offenders instead of by research on
adolescent development. That approach, however, has proven to be
ineffective and even counterproductive in preventing future offenses.
EJJ prosecutions have the potential to provide a viable alternative to
dealing with violent juvenile offenders, but only if juvenile justice
professionals use adolescent development theories when working with
EJJ juveniles. Not only must juvenile justice professionals use such
knowledge, but the legislature must also amend the statute to clarify
what conditions may trigger the adult sentence and to give judges
necessary discretion to adapt to a juvenile's changing circumstances.
EJJ will only be effective if the EJJ juveniles have the opportunities
569. See supra notes 550-556 and accompanying text (suggesting a procedure for technical
violations which ensure the juvenile has notice); supra note 564 and accompanying text (listing
factors Arkansas considers which focus on how the juvenile responded to services, the
seriousness of the original offense, and the recommendations of those who worked with the
juvenile).
570. See supra notes 378-385 and accompanying text (discussing the results of a probation
study which showed that many juveniles who committed a new offense while on probation still
completed probation successfully).
571. For a discussion about characteristics of juvenile crime, see MICHAEL RUTTER, HENRI
GILLER, & ANN HAGEL, ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR BY YOUNG PEOPLE 30-63 (1998). Theft is the
most common juvenile crime. Id. at 63. Violent crimes are a small proportion of juvenile crime.
Id. Offending tends to peak in the late teens then taper off with age. Id.
572. See supra notes 395-397 and accompanying text (giving an example of an EJJ juvenile
whose adult sentence was executed after he shoplifted some CDs, even though he would not have
been transferred to adult court for the original offense); supra note 567 (discussing the netwidening effect in Minnesota).
573. See supra note 564 (listing the Arkansas factors).
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they need to successfully complete their juvenile sentences. If Illinois
does not make these changes, the EJJ statute will become merely
another step on the path to the adult system.

